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Changing family - changing solidarity? 
The phenomenon of family solidarity1
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Abstract: Th e pluralisation of family forms signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uences several aspects of family solidarity and 
the solidarity between generations. Its analysis is made diﬃ  cult by its complexity: while values research into 
consensual and normative solidarity as well as the literature on the subject, deal with changes of emotional 
solidarity predominantly within theoretical frameworks, social and functional solidarity are examined 
through generational transfers. Th is paper attempts to provide an overview of the Hungarian conditions 
along the six interpretative dimensions elaborated by Vern L. Bengtson and Petrice S. Oyama with the help of 
earlier Hungarian empirical ﬁ ndings. Th e paper does not oﬀ er new empirical results; its primary achievement 
is being to ﬁ rst to approach the phenomenon of family solidarity with all its ramiﬁ cations in Hungary in 
an interdisciplinary context. Th e paper also attempts to reﬂ ect upon the fact that while family solidarity is 
undoubtedly a positive phenomenon at the level of the individual as well as that of the family (due to its role 
in protecting the self, identity, and supporting existential security), from a social point of view family and 
generational solidarity is a signiﬁ cant and increasingly dominant factor in regenerating social inequalities.
Keywords: family, solidarity, late modernity, inequality
1. Problems of family solidarity in late modernity
The concept of family solidarity is used naturally in public discourse, but also often 
in (family) sociological discourse: it is the attitude and integrational force inherently 
present in families that can be activated at any time which is maintained by the family 
– according to its functional definition. However, when examining the phenomenon 
more closely, this clarity is not so evident. Are we talking about intergenerational 
relations, or do we have to consider the context of family law? Is family solidarity 
a natural phenomenon, or is it of statutory origins? In other words, is it an entirely 
psychological relationship which evolves in certain interpersonal relationships when 
one individual takes responsibility for another through personal choice? Or is it an 
automatism deriving from (family) statuses and social norms?2
1 Writing of the present paper was made possible by funding from the College for Social Theory (TEK), Institute of Political History. 
Hereby I thank the members of TEK for their valuable comments, as well as all those colleagues who commented on an earlier 
version of the paper that was presented at the annual conference of the Hungarian Sociological Association in 2015 in Pécs.
2 Ideas about the notion of natural family unity are called ”new family naturalism“ in the Western literature on the subject 
(Théry 2007: 159).
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It is clear that since the beginning of the 2008 crisis an increasing number of 
people have resorted to the idea of family solidarity,3 as if there has been an increase 
in the demand for the institution of the family, in parallel with the disintegration of 
other social communities and the decline of trust in other institutions. It is a general 
conviction that strengthening family solidarity strengthens society itself, which 
derives from the old conception that the family is the fundamental “cell” of society, 
and if families are strong, so is society. According to this logic, the disintegration 
of families endangers the integration of society.4 Changes in families cannot be 
entirely blamed on the spread of individualism or the self-fulfilling aspirations of 
women (like many think); these are all consequences of fundamental social changes 
such as women’s paid employment, prolonged life expectancy, and the problem of 
single-parent families – just as the family cannot be interpreted using the nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century gender framework, where females dominate the private 
sphere of life and males dominate the public sphere.5
It cannot be a coincidence that the idea of family solidarity that supplements social 
solidarity strengthens when the state fails to organize intergenerational transfers 
well (for instance, from the old to the young, or more specifically, to the young 
unemployed, or the other way round): the problem of an aging society, financing 
pensions and social care all involve major economic issues and interests – that are 
disguised by the naturalistic rhetoric of family solidarity.
Based on the determining tendencies of recent years, many have argued that 
generational solidarity has weakened, while others claim that it has strengthened 
(McChesney – Bengtson 1988, Silverstein  et al. 1998, Vanhuysse 2014, Chauvel – 
Schröder 2014, Attias-Donfut 1995). Those who predicted a multiplicity of generational 
conflicts presupposed the intensifying perceptions of generational injustice, as a 
growing number of pensioners must be supported by a decreasing number of active 
employees. Many have warned of the growth of ageism: the number of very old people 
(above 85 years of age) is increasing, many of whom suffer from Alzheimer’s disease, 
are stroke patients, or have dementia, all of which conditions mean a burden both 
at the micro and macro level on the family and society. However, the younger, fitter 
elderly also find it difficult to find their place in societies dominated by digitalization 
and a cult of the young, to which they have considerable trouble adapting (Nelson 
2011, Bengtson – Oyama 2007: 13, NCPOP 2009).
3 An excellent example is the discourse about parent care.
4 This way of thinking is not unprecedented amongst some representatives of sociology of the family in Hungary, who 
look at the family in the spirit of the functionalism of the 1940s-1950s, and see it as something that can only fulfil its social 
function based on strictly distinct and complementary family and gender roles, with a constant and stable interconnection 
of participants that lasts until death. This conviction is further strengthened by the fact that in Hungary families that operate 
according to traditional gender roles are the most stable (i.e. enduring), and children are more likely to be born to such families 
than in ones where people choose to live together outside marriage. However, in families where the woman does not work, 
there are fewer children (Pongráczné – S. Molnár 2011: 99).
5 In the meanwhile, defining the notion of the family is increasingly problematic. In my paper I use it in a broader sense; i.e. to 
mean those who are directly related, living in a long-term relationship, or taking on the responsibility of taking care of a child.
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In contrast, more tools, coping strategies and mechanisms are becoming available 
to handle the issue of the growing number of elderly, while new norms are developing 
about their social (and not only economic) participation (Sabbagh – Vanhuysse 
2014, Tornstam 2005, Barrow – Hillier 2014). Others approach the issue from the 
dimension of normative solidarity – in terms of reciprocity, altruism, self-interest, 
and children’s duties –, emphasizing the power of the former, and demonstrating 
that while the care of the elderly can be influenced by economic factors, childcare 
exists even in late modernity: still more is being invested in the young by the old, and 
this “generational altruism” may ease the tension between generations (Barro 1974, 
Becker 1974, Lowenstein 2007, Lambrecht 2005, Bengtson et al. 2003, Lee 2013, Gal 
– Gergely – Medgyesi 2011).
It is clear that welfare transfers strongly favour the elderly, even today. This fact 
supports the arguments of those for whom the predestination of intergenerational 
conflict has been an issue since the 1980s, and which led to the problem of and the 
debate about intergenerational justice (Artus 2010, Vanhuysse 2014, Chauvel – 
Schröder 2014, Attias-Donfut 1995).
In retrospect, it is clear where the analysts went wrong. The hypothesis of 
intergenerational conflict is based on macro data, whereas research demonstrates the 
persistent presence of generational and family solidarity: on a micro level, help finds 
its way from the older generation to the younger in the form of voluntary support 
(Marshall et al. 1993, Bengtson et al. 2002). It is the application of pension systems 
and welfare transfers to the retired that make it possible for the elderly to help their 
children when it is necessary, and for the former to participate in transfer relations 
based on the principle of reciprocity, which ultimately lead to more frequent between-
family transfers (Lowenstein 2003, 2007, Lambrecht 2005, Wisensale 2013).
2. Applied analytical framework – the interdisciplinary 
perspectives of Bengtson and Oyama
The examination and interpretation of family solidarity and intergenerational 
solidarity is a highly complex task. Certain aspects are relatively easy to find operational 
concepts for and indices for measuring. The examination of various forms of help, as 
well as of the frequency of social relationships, is an old field of research with many 
well-developed research methods. However, there are a number of features that are 
much more difficult to capture with precise methods; ones that can only be grasped by 
taking the results of other disciplines into consideration. Bengtson and his colleagues 
have considered multiple (psychological, sociological, economic, and communicational) 
aspects of family solidarity since the 1990s in an attempt to provide a more complex 
description of the phenomenon (Roberts – Richards – Bengtson 1991, Bengtson – 
Oyama 2007). The present paper aims at summarizing the state of affairs in Hungary 
based on the six interpretational dimensions elaborated by Bengtson and Oyama, but 
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in doing so, it places them alongside the peculiar problems of late modernity in the light 
of Hungarian empirical findings. 
In this framework, emotional solidarity focuses on family members’ recognition 
of each other and their appreciation and expression of emotional support, while social 
solidarity concerns the nature and frequency of family members’ relationships with each 
other. Functional solidarity means the study of generational transfers, and economic (or 
other kinds of) support between generations. Bengtson and Oyama developed distinct 
analytical dimensions for the overlap between the views, values and aims of generations 
(“consensual solidarity”), as well as the expectations about the duties of children and 
parents; i.e., the norms relating to the importance of family values (“normative solidarity”). 
Structural solidarity includes “possibility structures” which create the framework for the 
other dimensions – for instance, geographical closeness or distance (Bengtson – Oyama 
2007).
2. a) Aff ectual solidarity
Affectual solidarity within the family is present in most discourses in the scientific 
literature, or more specifically, it is clearly interpreted as a highly positive phenomenon. 
When seeking an academic explanation for this, psychology offers a number of alternatives 
– from the theory of attachment, through evolutionary psychology, to the literature on 
altruism –, but there is no need to be an expert to see that the elderly always invest more 
in the young, in the psychological sense as well. Theories of late modernity – whether they 
are new socialization theories, metatheories, or diagnoses of the times – also emphasize 
the growing importance of emotional solidarity. As external frames of reference (and thus 
also support) for individuals loses its relevance, so family and relationships become the 
location for creating ontological security and identity (Giddens 1991, 1992, Kauffman 
2001, de Singly 2005, Takács 2013).6 These theories claim that the nature of family 
solidarity is being transformed as the function of the family is changing, with emotional 
factors becoming more and more significant.
As for Hungary, the involvement of an emotional component in family and 
generational solidarity is ambivalent. On the one hand, Hungarian society is well-known 
for its familist system of values. The findings of network studies from the 1980s that 
revealed the dominance of family relationships and of traditionalism (Hankiss 1976, 
1989, Hankiss et al. 1982, Angelusz – Tardos 1990, Utasi 1991, Füstös – Szakolczai 
1994, Cseh-Szombathy et al. 1994, Beluszky 2000) have many similarities with the 
conditions that existed in the period after the millennium, as people to this day rely on 
family relations to a greater extent than in Western or post-socialist countries (Pongrácz 
– S. Molnár 1997, 2011). Value studies in Hungary emphasize the existence of a strong 
familist attitude: the utmost importance of the family. The idea of familism sees family 
as the ideal scene for altruism and solidarity, where family is the (exclusive?) source of 
6 Based on American value studies, Bengtson has highlighted the continuous intensity of emotional solidarity since the 1970s 
(Bengtson - Oyama 2007).
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such values (Putnam 2000, Fukuyama 1995, Utasi 2013, Dupcsik – Tóth 2008, Füzér 
2015).7 Advocates of familism as an ideology in Hungary think that most Hungarian 
people would live their family lives according to traditional values if they could choose 
based on their innermost convictions, free of any social and economic obligations: 
the male head of the family would provide for the family financially, the wife would 
raise at least two or three children, and she would run the household (Dupcsik – Tóth 
2008).8 However, as Hungarian researchers emphasize, in such familist societies the 
source of familism is “Not the immanent but the relative strength of family relations 
and family-friendly attitudes, inasmuch as other social relations are weak and rare, are 
often coerced and are constantly prone to the danger of destabilization resulting from 
the mutual distrust of the participants.” (Dupcsik – Tóth 2008: 309).9 The question 
remains whether the tendencies of late modernity (the transformation to production 
through the market economy, growing inequalities in terms of wealth, the effects 
of individualization as evidenced by the increase in the number of single people) are 
eroding earlier forms of family solidarity, or on the contrary, if they are generating 
self-defensive mechanisms that enhance family union, assistance, and altruism. Many 
argue for the presence of social anomy and disintegration; i.e., that uncertainty and 
hopelessness penetrates everyday life; that integration is being enhanced at a micro level 
due to the increase in distrust of institutions and decision makers (Utasi 2013, Albert 
– Dávid 2015). However, it must also be considered that “while cooperation within the 
family, social solidarity - more specifically instrumental assistance - [operates] well due 
to (...) a network of strong relations, emotional solidarity, emotional contact show[…] 
significant shortages” (Utasi 2002: 389).
Approaching the issue from the definition of affectual solidarity – family members’ 
acknowledgement, appreciation and emotional support of each other – it has to be said 
that this type of family solidarity is not characteristic of Hungarian families in a society 
that struggles with a crisis of acknowledgement in spite of its strong family values. 
Familism involves not only the conservation of roles but often the denial of gender 
equality. Sharing of work in the family is not equal; women who take on household 
tasks and raise children do so as a second shift, as an unpaid, socially unappreciated 
7 In their paper on familism, Olga Tóth and Csaba Dupcsik highlight that familism can also be described as a social situation as 
well as an ideology that is typical of societies in which individuals can only rely on family relations due to a low level of personal 
and institutional trust. This is true not only of Hungary but China, as well as for a number of post-socialist countries where 
centralisation involves working traditions and practices with weak civil societies (Tóth – Dupcsik 2008).
8 In spite of the significant presence of women in the labour market in Hungary, the inequality of their share of work related 
to the household and caring for children or the elderly has not been questioned. According to the results of Hungarian and 
international values studies, Hungary is outstandingly familist, even among socialist countries. According to some data from 
2006, for instance, 64% of Hungarians agreed with the statement "The husband's role is to make money, and the wife's is 
to take care of the family and the household" (as opposed to 42% of Romanians and 40% of Poles), while almost 80% of 
Hungarians agreed that "being in employment may be important, but most women's real aim is to have a home and children" 
(58% in Romania, 40% in Poland). Moreover, acceptance of the statement that "being a housewife can be just as self-fulfilling 
for a woman as [having] a paying job" is almost 50%, even though the acceptance of the tradition of "husband as breadwinner 
- wife as housewife" weakened to some extent after the millennium, especially among the uneducated and unemployed (or 
those threatened with unemployment), who were forced to give up ideas deemed to be unrealistic from an economic point of 
view (Pongrácz – S. Molnár 2011: 102-105).
9 The discrepancy between the ideology and social state of familism and its reality is most striking in terms of the numbers of 
those who have children: family-centred countries such as Spain, Italy and even Hungary have the lowest fertility rates (Dupcsik 
– Tóth 2008).
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activity. Although in certain social groups increasing numbers of couples and parents 
share household chores or tasks involving children, monotonous and unpleasant 
tasks are still largely done by women, with no appreciation or acknowledgement 
(Murinkó 2014, Spéder 2011, Blaskó 2006, Pongrácz – Murinkó 2009, Harcsa 2014). 
The enormous pressure to follow the norm of helping aging parents is “naturally” 
assigned to women, especially among the undereducated; such tasks in Hungary are 
not presently considered to be socially acknowledgeable according to mainstream 
discourse (Tátrai 2016).
2. b) Associational solidarity
Associational solidarity (i.e., relationships among family members who belong to 
different generations) has become more common, according to research. This is partly 
due to widely accessible communication technologies, and partly to the phenomenon 
of post-adolescence (Kacsuk 2004, Somlai 2007). For this reason it is surprising that 
– in opposition to all the expectations formulated in literature about the subject – 
intergenerational relationships are loosening in Hungary as well, and an increase in the 
ability to choose is becoming more characteristic, as earlier observed in Western societies. 
The ability to choose, which earlier was characteristic with regard to friendships, is now 
increasingly present in family relations – i.e., people tend to keep in touch with those 
family members with whom they really want to (Albert – Dávid 2015).
Similarly to generational transfers, associational solidarity is one-sided: it is 
parents who maintain contact with their (adult) children most intensively. Adult 
children are less eager to do this, which is evident as there are more loose relationships 
in young adults’ lives, possibly due to social contact they have with the parents of 
a partner, or when divorce in childhood loosens or terminates a relationship with 
a parent10 and leads to tension and conflict between parents and the partner, as 
verified by Ágnes Utasi using Hungarian data (Utasi 2013). On the one hand, Utasi 
found that the intensity of the network of strong relationships decreased more for 
the younger generation than the older generation, and on the other, that there was 
a significant increase in the number of those who had terminated relationships, did 
not keep contact with and rarely and/or never met individuals with whom they are 
in “strong” relationships. Other research sees a significant decrease in (not only) the 
associational aspect of family solidarity in phenomena like the increasing isolation 
of single mothers, the symbiotic relationships of mother and children (that exclude 
the partner and/or the father), and a preference for female relations from the same 
age group instead of relatives (especially if the parents are still economically active, 
or tied up in another type of caretaking) (Gyarmati 2014)11. Associational solidarity 
varies in terms of social strata: Utasi’s representative study shows that relationships 
10 In France, 20% of divorced fathers do not see their children after the break-up of the marriage (Régnier-Loilier 2013)
11 The 2011 Household Monitor (Háztartás Monitor) study of confidential relationships also shows that, on average, the number 
of non-related confidants (i.e., voluntarily chosen relationships) has increased (Albert – Dávid 2015).
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are most intensive among people with a secondary education, as family relations are 
most prone to be damaged among those who live in poverty, making intensive contact 
more difficult. Those with a degree are distanced from their families by migration, or 
qualifications that result in other mobility, making encounters and communication 
rarer.12 The latest results of friendship research also show that in the past decade 
the number and significance of friends has increased to the detriment of family 
relations. This is partly due to the promiscuous nature of the labour market and an 
increase in precariousness, as such relationships involve weak ties and their potential 
for instrumentalization is becoming more valuable, along with the weakening trust 
among family members (Albert – Dávid 2015).
2. c) Functional solidarity
Among the various aspects of family solidarity, functional solidarity is most commonly 
measured; moreover, the generational transfers themselves often serve as indicators 
of family solidarity (cf. Krémer 2015: 195-201). A number of factors may influence 
the offer, acceptance and refusal of various forms of help and support. Martin Kohli 
distinguished financial transfers from the older to the younger generation based on the 
following functions: these improve the position of the elderly within the family, and 
in return they may expect help and care; they can control the behaviour of the young 
as a reward/punishment; they can help ensure the welfare of the young generation 
by compensating for the unfavourable effects of the market (especially in the case of 
disabled, unemployed and divorced children); and they reinforce relationships within 
the family, as well as enhancing cohesion (Kohli 1999, as quoted by Gyarmati 2014). 
According to the Hungarian as well as Western European literature, the direction of 
transfers is typically from the old to the young. As for Hungarian tendencies, “the 
amount of total net resources [transferred] to the children is higher (27% of the national 
income), than […] to the old” (Gál – Vargha 2015: 144). In Hungary, accumulated 
wealth is more typically handed over to children, instead of being spent. The majority 
of intergenerational transfers manifest in the form of help to buy a flat, followed by 
everyday financial support, and help of another nature (such as cooking, childcare, or 
DIY). It is clear from the transfer studies that today’s generation of parents (would) find 
it extremely difficult to survive without the financial help of grandparents in families of 
low as well as high status; the loans of young people that are taken out to finance having 
a family are mostly being repaid from the savings of older people with adult children 
who are preparing for retirement.
2. d) Consensual and normative solidarity
The changes in society and the value system of the last decades have resulted in 
interesting tendencies in terms of consensual and normative solidarity. The former is 
12 Based on the findings of Ágnes Utasi, weakening social solidarity due to mobility is mostly characteristic of people living in 
large villages (Utasi 2013).
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concerned with the differences and similarities in views and values between parents 
and children. Such differences may even lead to the conclusion that the conflict- (and 
sometimes deviance) based paradigms of the sociology of the youth are outdated. One 
of the most surprising findings of youth research in Hungary is the significant extent 
of agreement between children and parents in terms of their values, but other research 
involving German and French adolescents also emphasizes the existence of conflict-
free intergenerational relationships, highlighting the role of repeated compromises 
in everyday life ( Székely 2013, Galland 2008, 2010, de Singly 2006, Martuccelli – 
Dubet 1996). The convergence of the norms of the young and their parents is not 
surprising in late modern societies. The homogenizing effect of consumer society 
and the enhancement of the importance of popular culture bring about the fading of 
cultural differences between generations, but new dependencies in terms of functional 
family solidarity may result in an increase in consensual solidarity. This is why it is 
especially interesting how normative solidarity (i.e., expectations and hopes about 
children’s and parents’ duties) are developing. The increase in consensual solidarity 
requires that generations agree with traditional normative expectations and duties 
such as ensuring children’s institutional socialization and their socialization within 
the family, supplying emotional and financial support for the young, and caring for 
the old at the level of the family and society. Even if at the attitudinal level total 
agreement can be measured, research into everyday behaviour and Hungarian practice 
shows an entirely different picture. According to Andrea Gyarmati’s qualitative and 
Ágnes Utasi’s representative research, there is a clear difference in the relationships 
between people in their thirties and forties and their parents. The present generation 
of mothers rely on their parents’ help in terms of childcare far less (only occasionally), 
and reciprocity is not so evident, either. One reason for this is the different nature 
of mother-daughter relationships: the latter are closer and friendlier, but also come 
with an element of criticism; young people let others interfere with their child-raising 
principles to a far lesser extent than in earlier times. On the other hand, assistance on 
behalf of parents to adult children (grandchildren) in terms of care is also occasional 
and ad hoc, and the need to be available is not evident (Utasi 2013, Gyarmati 2014). 
The reverse arrangement, based on the index of “children’s responsibility” that is used 
to measure help provided to older parents, shows that in Hungary children have a 
lower sense of responsibility towards their parents than in other Eastern-European 
countries, rather similar to the younger generation of the majority of Western 
countries (Medgyesi 2016: 65). It is a well-known fact that a population with familist 
values has strongly paternalist expectations in everyday practice, so the low level of 
“children’s responsibility” can be explained by solidarity at the system level; i.e., to 
expectations about the welfare services of state.
The above types of generational solidarity and behavioural types are significantly 
affected by the structural factors that Bengtson and Oyama define as structural 
solidarity. These are primarily structures of opportunity determined by geographical 
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closeness/distance, which have not been a major factor for Hungarian families for a 
long time.13 Therefore, I narrowed down the scope of generational solidarity to its socio-
economic determinants. The pluralization of family forms affects patterns of family 
solidarity at many levels. The high number of divorces in Hungary reflects a lack of 
solidarity between partners (or parents), and also determines the range of possibilities 
for single parents. Having (a) child(ren) increasingly has less of an effect on both 
divorces and whether parents live in a relationship (Földházi 2008, 2015)14, and more 
than a third of underage youngsters experience the break-up of their (step) parents. The 
vulnerability of relationships brings with it a rearranged pattern of family solidarity: 
parents, especially single parents, have solidarity with their children, not their partners 
(Utasi 2002). This change in the role of children within the family may further enhance 
intergenerational solidarity, as the majority of young people who lack a permanent 
relationship15 can expect solidarity from their ‘mothers and sisters’.16 Providing constant 
support for a grown up child may result in a state of mutual emotional dependence, 
which can lead to constraints on adult lifestyles, and a decrease in the need to “move 
away”.
On the whole, European and North American research describes the persistence 
of the value of family community and the high intensity of family relations; however, 
the subject of these studies is the family itself. Other studies draw attention to the 
fact that a lot of intergenerational relationships can be characterized by indifference 
and detachment, as well as conflict, while Western and Hungarian results emphasize 
the decrease in the number of people living in relationships (Spéder – Szalma 2015).
Ambivalence and misuse – negative aspects of family 
solidarity
At the end of this paper, as a conclusion, I examine briefly how a prolonged 
life expectancy, changing relations and structures in the family, and changing 
governmental responsibility transform the mutual dependence of generations and 
social responsibility.
13 A number of ideas exist about the possible changes in the behaviour of young people who move abroad and start families in 
terms of family and generational solidarity. Measurable growth in the fertility rates of Hungarians settling down in Western 
European countries has been identified, but it is unclear yet whether the norms of the former concerning familial and behavioural 
patterns in terms of solidarity will adapt to those of the host country (e.g. mothers return to the labour market a short time after 
giving birth, reliance on non-relative assistance) or whether hybrid solutions will emerge (temporary or permanent immigration 
of grandparents, and Skype-relationships) or a possible loosening of the relationships between generations.
14 Presently, 60% of broken marriages involve children and 21% of families with a 15-year-old or younger child have a single 
parent, but 37% of young people between 15 and 18 had at least one period in their lives when only one of their parents was 
raising them (Monostori 2015). One-third of single mothers do not form a new relationship within five years. This does not 
automatically mean a new blended family, as some of the relationships involve 'living apart together' arrangements (According 
to Balázs Kapitány's estimations, today there are about five hundred thousand people in Hungary who live in long-term, 
exclusive 'living apart together' relationships; Kapitány 2012).
15 Representative data from  Székely 2013 [Hungarian Youth 2012] reveal that a quarter of young people between 15 and 29 
have not had a relationship, 40% of people between 25 and 29 have not lived together with a partner or spouse, and nearly a 
quarter of young people do not have a friend they would spend their free time with ( Székely 2013).
16 Fruzsina Albert and Ibolya Dávid's research shows a tendency for the mother/sister's role of confidant to be narrowed down to 
female family members as confidants become increasingly homogeneous in terms of gender: a male would consider another 
male a confidant, while females have other female confidants (Albert – Dávid 2015).
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It is widely believed that in the case of the deficiency or deterioration of welfare 
institutions –the weakening of organic solidarity, to use the Durkheimian expression 
– families are forced to rely on their internal resources and ask for help from within 
the family (“mechanical solidarity”). Some studies contradict this claim, and the idea 
of the automatic activation of family solidarity.17
In recent years it has become apparent in Hungary, as well as in other Western 
societies, that in contrast to expectations, a lack of services does not (and cannot) 
necessarily increase intergenerational transfer allocation (Jendrek 1993, as quoted by 
Gyarmati 2014: 52). External attempts to reinforce family solidarity on a legal basis, 
enhanced by the fact that a potential increase in grandparental help is available due 
to an aging society, represent forceful intrusions into the internal lives of families, as 
well as an attempt to refeudalize society. For instance, the legal regulation of parental 
care “as a solution” not only takes us back to the time before social insurance, but 
potentially dismantles family solidarity itself by introducing an outsider into the life 
of a family.
An increase in family solidarity may result from the weakening of society and social 
solidarity and can appear as a tool for overcoming social anomy and strengthening 
society at the same time. Family and generational solidarity, which are clearly assessed 
positively at a micro level, in fact serve as a major factor in the inequalities of new 
generations. Generational transfer studies arrive at similar conclusions regarding 
the decisive nature of parental assistance when starting one’s life, when entering 
the labour market, or when securing one’s livelihood. Clearly, family solidarity 
that manifests in parental help can result in the transmission of inequality from 
generation to generation. It is characteristic of both Western and Hungarian societies 
that the amount of support from the family is highest in case of young people with 
degrees (Medgyesi 2002), and that people in worse conditions receive neither more 
financial nor in-kind help from their families (Spéder 2002) – and nor can they 
hope to receive support from anyone else (Utasi 2013, Albert – Hajdú 2016). The 
sociological research into family and generational solidarity therefore is faced with 
the ambivalence that whilst this type of solidarity at an individual and family level 
can clearly be interpreted as a positive phenomenon (with its role as a supporter of 
the self, identity and financial security), in terms of society, family and generational 
solidarity are dominant and increasingly significant factors of the regeneration of 
social inequalities (Bourlès – Bramoullé – Perez-Richet 2016, Krémer 2015: 201). This 
topic, however, is outside the scope of family solidarity, as the issue of inequalities 
among families leads us to the problem of social justice.
17 Andrea Gyarmati cites English-speaking studies, but the issue requires thorough investigation (Gyarmati 2014).
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Abstract: While there is an upward trend in the time parents and children spend together, there is also 
intensifying parental anxiety about whether they are spending enough and suﬃ  cient quality time with 
children. Th e signiﬁ cant impact of parental time on children’s cognitive and social outcomes and wellbeing is 
well documented in the literature. Th is importance is also reﬂ ected in the often-used notion of quality time 
in academic and public debate, which emphasizes the nature of parental time. Moreover, there is growing 
evidence that a ‘squeezed’ feeling of time characterizes the lives of contemporary families. Th e diﬃ  culties of 
reconciling work and family life mostly concern parents. 
Th is paper reviews the literature about parental time based on the problem of time pressure, and related to 
this, the paradoxical anxiety of today’s parents about the time they devote to their children. Th e article aims 
to describe parenting trends and focuses on parental time by exploring its features and inﬂ uential factors. 
First, we review the characteristics of changing expectations about parenthood and discuss emerging 
concepts concerning the time parents and children spend together related to the ideals of contemporary 
parenting. Second, based on earlier empirical ﬁ ndings, the most important factors are outlined and 
elaborated. Reﬂ ecting on the Hungarian context, related ﬁ ndings are also presented. 
Keywords: parental time, intensive parenting, quality time, gender
Introduction1 
In the literature it is well-established that parental time is highly important for 
children’s futures since it has a positive impact on various outcomes. Most related 
studies focus on young children and their results emphasize the significant 
importance of early years (Waldfogel 2016). In agreement with this, parental time has 
been associated with fewer behavioural problems and better academic performance, 
and might positively affect children’s wellbeing (Offer 2013, Hsin – Felfe 2014, Milkie 
et al. 2010, 2015). However, there is ongoing academic debate in Western societies 
1 This paper was written as part of a National Research, Development and Innovation Fund project (‘Race against time’ NKFIH 
K120089). The author would like to thank the reviewers and editors for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this 
paper.
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about parental time, and several studies emphasize that it is not the amount but the 
quality of the time that parents and children spend together that matters for children’s 
outcomes and wellbeing (Hsin – Felfe 2014, Milkie et al. 2015). 
Although in Western societies contemporary families have the largest amount 
of leisure time at their disposal in the course of history (Kremer-Sadlik – Paugh 
2007), increasing amounts of evidence in academic and popular media supports 
the existence of a time famine (Sullivan – Gershuny 2001). It is mainly households 
with children who suffer from the difficulties of reconciling work and home life, and 
parents – mostly women – are reporting to feelings of stress caused by the need to 
organise their families under increasing time pressure (Milkie et al. 2010, Kremer-
Sadlik – Paugh 2007). 
The trend of time spent with children reveals the increasing importance of 
parental time; maternal time with children has not decreased, despite women’s 
entry into the paid workforce (Bianchi 2000). Furthermore, the tendency for fathers 
to spend more time with children is strengthening. These two trends have led to 
an increase in the total time dedicated to children, despite decreasing fertility 
levels (Sullivan – Gershuny 2001, Lam et al. 2012). However, there is also persistent 
evidence that the majority of American parents want to spend more time with their 
children (Milkie et al. 2004, Nomaguchi et al. 2005, Roxburgh et al. 2008). Although 
this increase is well-established in the literature, there is much less empirical 
knowledge about how parents and children spend time together (Craig et al. 2014). 
Concerning growing time pressure, numerous researchers emphasize the effect 
of the volatility of labour markets, and as a result focus their attention on changes in 
working conditions (Schor 1991, Van der Lippe 2007). Increasing flexibility broadens 
opportunities in terms of the combination of these two domains, although it can also 
generate conflict while actors strive for balance (Hochschild 2001, Kvande 2009, 
Van der Lippe 2007). The changing characteristics of work influence family life, 
the nature of parenting, and the time available for children (Wajcman et al. 2008, 
Galinsky 1999, StGeorge – Fletcher 2012). However, it should be highlighted that 
flexible working arrangements typically concern the service sector and particularly 
white-collar workers (Kvande 2009). Furthermore, families with children may face 
growing pressure from the changing expectations regarding the ‘other domain’; 
namely parenting (Van der Lippe 2007). In the academic discourse, special attention 
is being paid to a new type of fatherhood based on a more active and involved form of 
commitment that includes caring tasks (LaRossa, 1988, Spéder, 2011, Geszler, 2014). 
In line with this, the norm of intensive mothering has also recently strengthened in 
our societies. This ideology suggests that mothers should devote large amounts of 
time and energy to their children to ensure their proper development (Hays, 1996). 
This paper reviews literature about parental time and discusses the problem in 
the social context of the ‘squeezed’ feeling of time that characterizes the lives of 
families in contemporary Western societies. This approach, using insights from time 
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pressure literature, might contribute to the better comprehension of contemporary 
parenting. Moreover, the review of the literature may raise important and still 
unexplored issues about parental time. Although research on parenting is still 
lacking in Hungary, better understanding of the features of contemporary parenting 
might reveal some important characteristics of family functioning and the work-life 
interface. This review thus highlights the potential of research on parenting. 
Consequently, the paper elaborates the dominant cultural model of parenting and 
the related concepts of time. Furthermore, and connected to the idea of intensive 
parenting, it aims to describe the important factors that influence parental time. 
Related to these factors, the paper reviews earlier findings about parental time mostly 
from English literature. Moreover, the related Hungarian context will be elaborated.
The paper is structured as follows: as a point of departure it introduces the ideal 
of intensive parenting and the concept of parental time. The following section, based 
on earlier empirical findings, provides an overview of the important factors which 
are connected to the feeling of time pressure and thereby influence parental time. 
Subsequently, the Hungarian context is described based on earlier findings. Last, 
we present and discuss the main conclusions and propose some further and still 
unexplored areas of research related to parental time. 
Intensive parenting 
Numerous scholars have argued that what we think about parenting concerning 
expectations and experiences has changed enormously in the last couple of decades 
(Hays 1996, Nelson 2010, Faircloth 2014). As a result of the development of a 
contemporary parenting culture, the concept of ‘intensive parenting’, which was 
introduced by Sharon Hays (1996), has emerged (Faircloth – Lee 2010). The former 
author explored expectations about motherhood in her influential book. While the 
rise of this parenting cultural script emerged first in the US and the UK, in recent 
years it has also spread beyond these countries (Dermott – Pomati 2016). 
Hays (1996) defines the new commitments that characterise contemporary 
mothering in the following way: “the methods of appropriate child rearing are construed 
as child-centred, expert-guided, emotionally absorbing, labour intensive, and financially 
expensive” (p. 8). Intensive motherhood prescribes obligations and thereby serves as 
a normative standard rather than a description of the practices of every mother. The 
claim suggests that time with mothers has become especially highly valued (Milkie et al. 
2015), so the norm reflects the high expectations that a good mother is always available 
for her children (Nagy – Paksi 2014, Milkie et al. 2010), although this ideal may prove 
challenging, particularly to employed mothers (Christopher 2012). 
Faircloth (2014) accentuates the importance of another influential piece of work that 
illustrates the features of today’s parenting; namely, Frank Furedi’s Paranoid Parenting, 
first published in 2001. Furedi applies risk as an underlying concept and argues that 
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today’s parents are constantly worrying and questioning whether they are parenting 
correctly (cited by Faircloth 2014). Consequently, Faircloth (2014) suggests that 
parenting has expanded in scope and nowadays requires a growing range of activities 
due to the shift in perceptions of children, who are seen as “more vulnerable to risks 
impacting on physical and emotional development than ever before” (p. 26). In line 
with this perspective, the highly valued position that children occupy in contemporary 
families may provide an explanation for these changed expectations (Gillis 2003). 
To summarize, the logic of intensive parenting means that parents are seen as 
totally responsible for their children’s social, emotional and educational success 
(Faircloth 2014). This intensive style of parenting, which demands large amounts of 
time, energy, and material resources, is also reflected in popular debates about ‘tiger 
moms’ and ‘helicopter parents’ (Faircloth 2014, Dermott – Pomati 2016). The former 
term refers to mothers who push their children to do extra-curricular activities to 
ensure their success, while helicopter parents are those who are overprotective and 
constantly monitor their children (Dermott – Pomati 2016). Moreover, in relation to 
this topic a new ideal of fatherhood is emerging (Geszler 2014). The category of ‘new’ 
or ‘active’ fatherhood emerged in the 1960s in American social research. According 
to the most popular view of changing fatherhood, this redefinition of the fathers’ 
role in the family is a consequence of changes in women’s positions in society, as a 
result of which families face greater challenges with arranging childcare. The result 
is that ideals of ‘fathers’ have evolved in American society that involve active, caring 
involvement and a close emotional bond between father and child (LaRossa 1988).
Concepts of parental time 
The time parents and children spend together is one important aspect of intensive 
parenting. Parental time can include all kinds of parent-child interactions, including 
interactions with only one of the parents, so it consequently refers to both maternal 
and paternal time.
The current discourse about parenting, as presented above, underlines that the 
cultural views of parenting are dominated by the quality of parent-child relationships, 
and time has become one of the most important components of that relationship and 
therefore of the parenting experience (Roxburgh 2012). A diversity of approaches are 
taken in the literature to express the significance of time parents and children spend 
together. In the following section of this paper, these ideas will be elaborated. 
There is a broad concept of family time which reflects on the importance of spending 
special time with family and the children. This concept includes the idea that our lives 
should be organised in a child-centred way (Gillis 2003), mirrors a romanticized version of 
family life, and puts traditional family values into focus, where the emphasis is placed on 
the creation of quality time that promotes family well-being (Daly 2001). Consequently, 
family time refers to an idealized infinite time which families live according to (Ashbourne 
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– Daly 2012). Daly (2001), in investigating the ideal of family time, distinguishes three 
attributes of this concept. First, according to parents, family time is dedicated to the 
social production of memories. Togetherness and positive time are at the core of this 
notion. Last, this time may be particularly highly valued when it involves spontaneity. 
As a consequence, family time refers to family rituals, traditions and family events, and 
also time which might be spontaneously used but enables the experience of togetherness 
(Daly 2001, Daly-Ashbourne 2012), like time spent together watching movies and playing 
games. Family time thus emphasizes the importance of quality itself. 
The concept of ‘quality time’ emerges in the frame of family time. Snyder (2007) 
describes the significance of quality time as follows: “‘Quality time’ has become part 
of our cultural discourse concerning what it means to be a ‘good’ parent” (p. 320). 
This qualitative aspect of time comes to the fore; the notion of quality time primarily 
accentuates the nature of the interaction and not the amount of time families 
spend together: consequently, the emerging concept of ‘quality time’ differs from 
its temporal characteristics and subjective experience is highlighted. Accordingly, 
time is considered a social construction, which includes values and beliefs about how 
individuals should efficiently use their time (StGeorge – Fletcher 2012). 
On the one hand, the concept of ‘quality time’ reflects the problem of time scarcity 
in family life (Kremer-Sadlik – Paugh 2007) by emphasizing the importance of the 
nature and not the total amount of time the family spend together. On the other 
hand, this works as a cultural model of parenting. Accordingly, the notion of quality 
time includes beliefs about how parents should spend time with their children to 
enhance positive outcomes for them, and ensure their proper development and close 
parent-child relations (Snyder 2007, StGeorge – Fletcher 2012). 
The desire for the cognitive enhancement of children is of crucial significance 
in parenting culture, and its importance is reflected in many activities which are 
seen as indicators of good parenting, such as reading with children, helping with 
homework, and organising cultural programs (Dermott – Pomati 2016). The 
inclusion of extra-curricular activities in the day-to-day lives of children is also 
aimed at their cultural development (Lareau 2003). In the literature, quality time 
has been defined as the amount of time spent on activities of a particular quality 
which are seen as interactive or enriching for children, like reading, talking, playing 
or eating with parents, etc. (Milkie et al. 2015, Kalil et al. 2016)2. 
Factors that inﬂ uence parental time
There are several important factors that influence parental time, Monna and 
Gauthier (2008) extensively explored the social and economic determinants of these 
2 There are several different methods for measuring parental time, although the majority of the reviewed literature uses time 
diary data. However, parental time may be differentiated according to diverse categories of activities in order to capture the 
nature of this time. However, the description of the measurement of time goes beyond the scope of this article.
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in their review article. Although the model of intensive parenting is an important 
cultural ideal for virtually all parents, it does not affect everyone in the same way 
(Faircloth 2014). Therefore, in the following section of this paper we review some 
more recent empirical findings, and four important dimensions related to the 
emerging concept of parenting are elaborated. These factors are also important for 
comprehending the increasing feeling of time pressure related to parenting.
Th e age of children
First of all, the age of children is one of the most dominant factors that influences 
the amount of time parents devote to children. There is persistent evidence that 
parental time decreases as children age (Kendig – Bianchi 2008, Monna – Gauthier 
2008, Craig et al. 2014). On the one hand, in the first years childcare is highly time-
demanding as parental time is mostly characterized by personal care tasks such 
as feeding, dressing, etc. On the other hand, in line with the concept of intensive 
parenting, the importance of early years might also explain the increasing amount 
of time parents spend with children in this period (Monna – Gauthier 2008, Craig et 
al. 2017). Waldfogel (2016) argues that, based on the well-explored impact of early 
childhood experiences on children’s outcomes, the significance of parental time, 
especially maternal, is the strongest norm related to these years (Waldfogel 2016). 
Craig et al. (2014) compared Australian time use data between 1992 and 2006 to 
explore changes in parental time with regard to the emerging concept of intensive 
parenting. The authors found that the increase in parental time concerned only 
children aged 0-4 years. 
Demands for family time are most pressing in early childhood (Monna – Gauthier 
2008), which is also reflected in research findings about the subjective experience of 
time. Milkie and her colleagues (2004) investigated both objective measures of time 
and subjective assessments about the time parents and children spend together in the 
US. They found that the feeling of time strain was associated with the child’s age (the 
parents of preschool children reported more time strain). Furthermore, a recent study 
of gender differences in parents’ subjective time pressure based on Australian time 
use data from 2006 also confirmed that parents who had a child of under five years of 
age in the household were more likely to report feeling rushed (Craig – Brown 2017). 
However, other studies underline the significance of adolescence. Nelson (2010) 
argues that according to the concept of intensive mothering, this is also a significant 
period for establishing and supporting children’s success. Milkie and her colleagues 
(2015) in a recent study about the US found that parental time – if both parents 
are present – has a positive impact on several indicators of adolescent wellbeing. 
Moreover, maternal time appeared to be significant only for teenagers (aged 12-18 
years) and not for school-aged children (aged 3-11 years). This result refers to the time 
parents are directly involved in participating in certain activities, conceptualized as 
‘engaged time’. 
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Gender
Parenting is a highly gendered experience (Faircloth – Lee 2010, Faircloth 2014), and 
in the following section the importance of gender will be discussed in more detail. 
First, the norm of intensive mothering has emerged and strengthened in our societies, 
although the expression of and emphasis on parenting tends to conceal the reality that 
mothers undertake most caring tasks and are primarily responsible for their children 
(Faircloth – Lee 2010). However, in the academic discourse special attention is paid to 
the above-mentioned new type of fatherhood based on a more active, more involved 
form of commitment that also includes caring tasks (LaRossa 1988, Spéder 2011). 
There is persistent evidence that the reconciliation of work and family commitments 
mainly concerns women (Schor 1991, Hochschild 2001). Moreover, becoming a parent 
strengthens traditional patterns: as mothers leave the labour market, the working 
time of fathers increases (Craig – Mullan 2010). Moreover, the gendered nature of 
parental leave might add to perceptions of unequal labour at home (Rehel 2014). 
As for time-use data, although the trend is moving towards greater parity in terms 
of the time parents spend with children due to the increasing amount of time fathers 
spend with offspring (Rehel 2014, Craig et al. 2014, Hofäcker 2007), maternal time 
remains longer and has not decreased since women’s entry into the labour market 
(Bianchi 2000). Moreover, not only the amount of time but the different nature of the 
time that is spent with children also proves that the gender division in parental time 
remains strong. While fathers are more likely to participate in leisure and educational 
activities with children, mothers are mostly responsible for more labour-intensive 
tasks such as providing physical and routine care (Monna – Gauthier 2008, Craig et al. 
2014). Additionally, fathers who spend time with children are more likely to do so in the 
presence of their partner, while mothers spend more solo time with children (Craig et al. 
2014, Kalil et al. 2014). Concerning multitasking, Offer and Schneider (2011) examined 
data in the US and found that mothers spent ten hours a week more than fathers 
engaged in multitasking, which time was mostly dedicated to childcare and housework. 
Moreover, while multitasking at home for mothers had negative outcomes (like work-
family conflict, stress, etc.), for fathers it was not associated with negative impacts. 
In line with the trend described above, Craig and her colleagues (2014) also described 
how Australian fathers spent significantly more time with children in 2006 than in 
1992. Concerning the type of activities, the scholars suggest that paternal time with 
children involves much greater proportions of leisure time than maternal time.
Highlighting the features of the cultural norms of parenting, a US study on 
educational differences and cross-spouse effects on parents’ time with children 
concluded that cultural values are stronger for mothers, since their educational level 
is more likely to determine both maternal and paternal time than men’s education 
(England – Strivastava 2013). These facts confirm the claim that women face an 
intense dual burden of work and private life, and that the nature of time spent with 
children can lead to more time pressure. 
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However, there are some conflicting results about the gendered characteristics of 
time pressure. On the one hand, Nomaguchi et al. (2005) suggest that time pressure 
is influenced by gender, and women are more time-pressured. The authors describe 
how fathers are more likely to report spending insufficient time with their children 
and spouses, while the time strain involved in the parental role – and also in the 
role of spouse – only negatively influences mothers’ wellbeing among dual-earner 
parents. This result confirms claims about the pressure of the cultural norms of 
modern motherhood. On the other hand, Roxburgh (2012) argues that it has not 
been confirmed that there is a difference between mothers and fathers concerning 
the amount of free time, or in the feeling of time pressure (Roxburgh 2012). The 
author focused more precisely on the effect of a ‘squeezed’ feeling of time related 
to parenting, and found that, for both men and women, feelings about time with 
children are a relevant source of stress among American dual-earner couples. 
As a consequence, and based on her results, Roxburgh concludes that “changing 
normative expectations may be placing additional stress on working fathers” and at 
the same time, these “changes in expectations for fatherhood are not concomitant 
with decreases in expectations for mothers” (p. 1054).
This contradiction might be explained by Sebők’s (2014) conclusion. The author 
argues that while job characteristics influence work-life conflict among men and 
women equally, family factors primarily negative impact the reconciliation of work-
life balance among women. 
Socioeconomic status
In this section of the paper, the impact of family socioeconomic status is 
elaborated, since this significantly determines the mode of parenting and parental 
time, especially its qualitative aspects. Economic resources – strongly connected to 
the family structure – and human and social capital can influence how individuals 
meet the requirements of the ideal of intensive parenting. Moreover, it is important 
to note that the new expectations about parenting are deeply influenced by the 
norms of the middle class (Dermott – Seymour 2011). 
The significance of material resources was mentioned above related to the ideology 
of intensive mothering. The consumption of material goods that defines the diverse 
methods of parenting requires a certain level of economic resources (Faircloth – Lee 
2010). The ability to organise cultural programs, go to movies, or buy board games and 
books is notably dependent on the financial situation of the family. 
In addition, Esping-Andersen (2009) underlines the importance of parental time 
investment in understanding rising inequalities. He argues that, although children 
at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder may receive more parental time due to 
the lower labour demands of their parents, the number of siblings in the family and 
the quality of parental time investment may put them in a worse position. Empirical 
findings demonstrate gaps in children’s outcomes according to family social status 
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and also confirm the importance of the quality of time parents and children spend 
together. The difference in outcomes appears as early as in early childhood and 
determines opportunities later in life (Kalil – Mayer 2016).
Related to economic resources, the disadvantaged position of single parents may 
be underlined. In line with this, family structure is also highly influential since there 
is a growing proportion of one-parent and also multinuclear families (Vaskovics 2014). 
Parental time with children can differ significantly between the various forms of 
families (Waldfogel 2016). However, Kendig and Bianchi (2008) suggest that it is not 
the structure of the family but rather the societal position that matters. Investigating 
the relationship between family structure and maternal time in the US in mid 2000s, 
scholars found that single mothers spent less time with children, as consistent with 
earlier empirical evidence. The data explained the lower time investment according 
to their disadvantageous social structural position, and the authors proposed that 
the differences between mothers in similar circumstances (employment, education, 
or age) would otherwise disappear. In contrast, after exploring the time investment 
across family structures in the US, Kalil and her colleagues (2014) argue that family 
structure influences the time devoted to children. The authors report that the solo 
parenting time of single mothers (the time children spend only with the mother) is 
even greater than that of married mothers. They propose that the lower total time 
investment that children with single mothers receive is the result of little time 
investment from non-resident biological fathers, and/or mothers’ resident boyfriends. 
Furthermore, they conclude that children in two biological parent families might offer 
children the most benefits based on the greater amount of parental time they invest, 
including solo father time.
Furthermore, the intensive style of parenting also demands a specific skill-set: “a 
certain level of expertise about children and their care, based on the latest research on 
child development, and an affiliation to a certain way of raising a child” (Faircloth – Lee 
2010: 1). The ability to make these choices is typically the privilege of well-educated 
parents (Faircloth – Lee 2010). The educational level of parents influences the amount 
and characteristics of the time parents and children spend together. Concerning 
maternal time in terms of both quality and quantity, several studies have confirmed 
the difference between less and more educated mothers (Sayer et al. 2004; Kendig – 
Bianchi 2008). Hsin and Felfe (2014) emphasize the importance of quality, and argue 
that it is not the total amount of time that varies, but rather the way parents spend time 
with their children. Often mothers at the bottom end of the socioeconomic ladder do 
not have the knowledge and resources to live up the cultural expectations of modern 
parenting (Nomaguchi et al. 2016). This hypothesis has been proved by Bianchi and 
Robinson (1997) who reported, based on time diary data from a sample of children 
from California aged between three and eleven, that parental education is a strong 
predictor of human and social capital investment. This result confirms the importance 
of difference in terms of class and education. 
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Furthermore, concerning the issue of quantity, a more recent study that 
examined time diary data in the US in the 2000s also confirmed earlier empirical 
evidence that well-educated parents invest significantly more time in their children 
(England and Strivastava 2013). The authors accentuate the importance of the 
cultural norms of parenting to explain their findings – namely, that more highly 
educated parents spend more time on childcare, although they are more likely to be 
employed and work full-time. However, England and Stravistava (2013) distinguish 
between several types of activities and find no significant differences in terms of 
the activities that support children’s cognitive learning or basic care according to 
parental educational level. 
Characteristics of the work of parents
In the literature the employment patterns and work characteristics of parents are 
the focus of the investigation of parental time, mostly instigated by the persistent 
debate in Western societies about how maternal employment affect children’s 
outcomes and wellbeing. 
Concerning the quantity of time available for children, parents’ employment 
status strongly determines this; empirical findings demonstrate that there are 
significant differences in the amount of time spent with children according to 
maternal employment status, with the result that much less time is spent with 
children of employed mothers (Kendig – Bianchi 2008). 
However, results of a study of the influence of working hours questions its 
significance based on cross-national data (Sayer – Gornick 2012). Sayer and Gornick 
(2012) examined time diary data from nine countries (included English-speaking 
and Nordic countries, France and Slovenia) and proposed that it is not employment 
patterns nor the gender regime but rather the cultural norms of parenting that 
define parental time. Their conclusion are based on the finding that time spent with 
childcare was no less in countries with high maternal employment rates and long 
working hours. For example, while countries with a different culture of working 
hours and work-family policies like Norway and Canada showed similarities, similar 
countries (France and Norway) showed great differences in time devoted to care. 
Emphasizing the importance of the nature of time devoted to children in recent 
debates, there is growing academic interest in whether it is simply the amount 
of time that matters for children (Milkie et al. 2015), and how much patterns of 
employment (non-standard work, flexibility etc.) affect the quality of time parents 
spend with children (Liana et al. 2011). 
Concerning the impact of working life on the family, several studies have found 
a negative effect. Focusing on parenting, Galinsky (1999) investigated parents and 
children using large-sample representative research and also conducted interviews 
in the US in the 1990s. The author also highlighted that the changed characteristics 
of work have led to longer working hours and more time pressure. Her results 
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support the hypothesis of negative spillover3 from work to family: Galinsky found 
that holding a job reduces the energy for parenting. In addition, the findings 
of an Australian study (Wajcman et al., 2008) underline the importance of job 
characteristics: the employees’ degree of control over start and finish times, work 
stress, and working hours are determinants of work-to-family spillover. 
Focusing especially on parental time, Roeters and her colleagues (2010) applied a 
path model to research the quality of Dutch parents’ and children’s relations through 
examining parental time. They suggest that it is not only the amount but also the 
nature of time that is determinant. Roeters et al.’s study demonstrated complex and 
mixed findings about the impact of the characteristics of work. First, long working 
hours decrease time spent with children, resulting in lower quality relationships. 
Moreover, while non-standard forms of work by the mother led to more time with 
children, they also resulted in more disturbance in terms of work commitments and 
less focused time on children, thereby negatively impacting relationship quality. 
Finally, on the one hand, work engagement resulted in more parental time and thereby 
better relationships, but on the other, work engagement led to more interruptions 
during the time spent with children, resulting in lower quality relationships. 
Th e Hungarian context
Most of the theories and empirical findings described above concern Western 
societies, primarily the United States, where the issue of work-life balance and the 
parental anxiety surrounding spending enough (and enough ‘efficient’) time with 
children have emerged as salient issues as the ‘male-as-earner-female-as-carer’ 
model has been replaced by the dual-earner family model. Finally, the Hungarian 
context and related empirical findings will be reviewed. A description of both gender 
and working regime are important for comprehending the patterns of parental time 
in Hungary. First, we briefly review the gender-related attitudes and characteristics 
of the labour market. In the following sections, empirical data about parental time 
and work-life interfaces will also be elaborated on. 
Hungary as a post-socialist country has a long tradition of women’s labour participation; 
moreover, after the demise of the regime the state even reinforced the role of motherhood, 
providing generous state support for parental leave and childcare. These re-familization 
policies resulted a strengthening of traditional attitudes and patterns concerning 
the gendered division of labour (Hobson et al. 2013, Nagy 2010). While there is some 
empirical evidence that, during the 2000s, attitudes related to gender roles became 
more egalitarian, traditional views and unequal practices have not altered significantly. 
3 Spillover theory highlights the integration of the two domains through mutual influence, and does not consider that the 
domains are separate. Accordingly, positive or negative attitudes, feelings, values, and behaviours may cross from one sphere 
to the other, leading to similarities between the two spheres (Roehling et al., 2003). 
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However, Pongrácz and S. Molnár (2011) found that while the dual-earner family model 
has become generally acknowledged mainly because families need two paid jobs to have 
a sense of financial security, the majority still prefer a gendered division of labour. 
Concerning parenting, Gregor (2016) investigated the changes in attitudes in the 
2000s and reported that general beliefs about gender roles have become more equal 
and flexible, but traditional attitudes about gender roles in the family remain strong. 
Ideas about the ideal number of small children are generally connected to the more 
traditional attitudes of both men and women. Moreover, the value placed on having 
children in Hungary is very high compared to other countries, a fact suggested by 
both an examinations of attitudes (Pongrácz – S. Molnár 1994) and by data about 
time use (Hofäcker 2007). 
As far as working regimes are concerned, labour force participation is low in Hungary 
on international comparison. However, in the last couple of years the employment 
rate has increased, although it is still below the EU15 average, and compared to the 
countries of the region, Hungary is still lagging (Scharle 2016). The low participation 
rates particularly concern women, especially mothers of small children (Hobson et al. 
2013). The high rate of unemployment and sense of an unstable future because of a 
precarious economy are related to a prevalence of low wages and irregular, precarious 
jobs which increase insecurity. Moreover, long working hours characterize the labour 
market, and there are limited opportunities for flexible and non-standard work 
schedules, such as part-time work (Hobson et al. 2013, Frey 2011). 
To sum up, societal norms related to gender and the structural characteristics of 
the labour market such as long working time regimes and precariousness (Hobson 
et al. 2013) mean that time pressure related to parental time might be an issue of 
particular concern to Hungarian society.
Parental time data
In this section of the paper, changes in time use data about parental time will be discussed. 
Hungarian data from 2009/2010 show a similar trend to the international trends 
described above. Accordingly, an increase in the time spent on childrearing activities 
is observable among Hungarian couples in the past three decades, while parental time 
almost doubled during this period. Since the time that fathers spend with children has 
increased remarkably, the inequality in parental time between mothers and fathers has 
decreased. Moreover (and surprisingly among professionals), fathers are tending to spend 
more time with children compared to mothers, reflecting the emerging cultural norm 
of involved fatherhood. However, the gendered difference in childcare has remained 
strong: mothers tend to spend twice as much time with children per day than fathers. 
Furthermore, this gendered division of roles is reflected not only in the amount of time 
but also in the nature of activities: while mothers are primarily responsible for caring 
tasks, fathers take part in leisure activities and playing with children (Harcsa, 2014). 
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Some data highlight the changing cultural norms of parenting. The structure 
of parental time has changed significantly: time for reading and playing was four 
times greater in 2010 than at the end of the 1980s, while time spent on caring tasks 
decreased during this period. Considering the time spent on shared activities, there 
has been a significant increase in parents engaging in activities only with the child. 
However, it is important to note that the increase in time spent parenting primarily 
concerns children until they reach school-age, while time spent on shared activities 
with children older than seven years is decreasing. This finding might reflect the 
overscheduled life of school-aged children (Harcsa 2014), and shows the relevance of 
further explorations of parental time with older children.
Furthermore, there is a difference in time spent on the family according to 
the parents’ educational level; namely, parents with a better education have more 
time for families, and this discrepancy has increased. On the one hand, this might 
indicate that parents with lower levels of education are more affected by time 
squeeze (Harcsa 2014), but on the other, it might reflect the high value awarded 
family time in relation to contemporary parenting culture in higher social classes.
Parents’ work-life balance
An increase in parental time might affect the work-life balance of parents. However, 
examples of research into parenting are still lacking, while earlier findings typically 
demonstrate the difficulty of managing this issue that stems from the structural 
characteristics of labour. 
Utasi (2011) examined negative stress stemming from work based on ESS data 
from 2005, comparing various regions of Europe. She found that negative work 
stress affected the private sphere most significantly in Central-Eastern Europe, 
particularly among women. Hobson and her colleagues (2013) investigated individual 
perceptions of alternatives and claims for WLB through a comparison of Sweden and 
Hungary based on qualitative interviews conducted with employed parents. They 
found that Hungarian parents have only a weak sense of entitlement to work-life 
balance. The authors explained their results by pointing to the long working time 
regime and the precarious labour market. 
Consistent with other international findings, employees with families experience 
more stress in terms of reconciling work and family (Tóth 2007). Moreover, Nagy 
(2008) investigated male managers and found that conflict in their lives was 
primarily connected to children, especially to the insufficient time they were able 
to spend with children, although the interviewees accentuated the importance of 
spending quality time with offspring (Nagy 2008). 
In line with this finding, Takács (2013), based on survey data collected from 
employed parents in Budapest, also argues that quality parenting, which is defined by 
dedicating quality time to children, has become an important expectation of being a 
parent. The growing importance awarded to spending sufficient time with children 
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is also reflected in the findings of some recent empirical, qualitative studies. Takács 
(2015) reported that fathers who consider themselves active in their fathering role 
complained about the insufficient time they can devote to their children because of 
the time constraints of work. Moreover, recently recorded interviews with managers 
about their work-life balance highlight the significance of quality instead of quantity 
time (Nagy 2016). 
Conclusions
While there has been an increase in the time that parents and children spend together 
– especially in the case of fathers (Sullivan – Gershuny, 2001; Harcsa, 2014; Hofäcker, 
2007; Lam et al., 2012) –, contemporary parents complain about the insufficient 
time they are able to devote to their children (Milkie et al., 2004; Nomaguchi et al., 
2005; Roxburgh et al., 2008). On the one hand, the squeezed feeling of time that 
characterizes the lives of contemporary families might influence the nature and the 
perception of the time that parents and children spend together. On the other hand, 
the growing importance of the amount and quality of parental time might be related 
to cultural standards about good parenting (StGeorge – Fletcher 2012). 
The quality aspect of time highlights its subjective experience according to family 
members, and includes values and beliefs about how parents should efficiently spend 
time with their children (StGeorge – Fletcher, 2012). The contemporary cultural 
norm of parenting has exacerbated difficulties by raising expectations, or in other 
words, emphasizing the need for parents to devote sufficient time to their children 
to ensure and enhance their development, wellbeing and a close parent-child bond 
(Sullivan – Gershuny, 2001; StGeorge – Fletcher, 2012; Milkie, 2010).
These expectations are embedded in the model of intensive parenting that reflects 
the notions of intensive mothering and involved fathering. This model, in the frame of 
a post-Fordist labour market that creates an unbounded working culture and thereby 
requires constant availability, raises the pressure on adults (Milkie et al., 2010). Indeed, 
empirical findings confirm the fact that families with dependent children – especially 
dual-earner families and single parents – are those most affected by the phenomenon 
of time famine (Sullivan – Gershuny 2001, Milkie et al. 2010). 
In this review of English literature about the trends and factors influencing 
parental time from the perspective of time pressure, we have described four 
determining factors which might affect the quantity and the quality of parental 
time. Elaborating on these factors and discussing the related empirical findings 
about time-related trends in Western societies, the patterns of contemporary 
parenting have been described.
First, the age of children is the most influential factor in defining parental time; 
accordingly, time investment decreases as children get older. On the one hand, this is 
based on the need for physical care in early childhood. On the other, the importance 
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of time investment in early years for promoting the healthy development of children 
might also explain the greater amount of parental time. In addition, some empirical 
results suggest that expectations based on the idea of intensive parenting mostly 
affect the parents of young children. 
Secondly, the gender differences in parenting remain strong, a fact which 
is reflected not only in the amount but also in the nature of time spent with 
children. Fathers are more likely to participate in leisure and recreational activities 
with children, besides spending much less solo time with children than mothers. 
Furthermore, multitasking is more likely to characterize maternal time which might 
negatively influence mother’s time pressure and wellbeing. To summarize, despite 
the changing expectations that fatherhood should measure up to new cultural 
standards, parenting still involves women more intensively than men. 
Furthermore, the impact of socioeconomic status is underlined. This factor is the most 
complex one and relates to other dimensions and determines the quality of time most 
strongly. The social and cultural resources of parents can be utilized through interaction 
that enhances a child’s cognitive development. This process is determined mostly by the 
educational level of parents. Furthermore, material resources also influence how parents 
and children spend time together. In addition, family structure might play a crucial role, 
primarily concerning the disadvantageous position of single mothers. 
Last, the impact of work characteristics is highlighted. Although working hours 
predict how much time parents can devote to children, the growing importance of 
quality time questions the significance of this factor. Therefore, other features of 
work – like nonstandard arrangements, flexibility, engagement, etc. – may be more 
important in determining the nature of time. Concerning these characteristics, 
empirical findings offer a mixed picture. 
Moreover, a review of the related Hungarian empirical results finds the same 
patterns, showing that time pressure related to parenting might be a relevant issue 
in the Hungarian context.
There are some limitations of the reviewed literature which might instigate 
further inquiry into parental time. First of all, the available time budget research 
data enables multifaceted research into the quantity (and in some cases the 
quality) of the time parents and children spend together. However, these data 
sets can only provide a limited explanation for how these interactions determine 
and influence family functioning and the parent-child relationship. Although the 
literature emphasizes the importance of quality time, the subjective experience of 
time cannot be measured using time use data. Qualitative inquiries could reveal the 
changing perceptions of time and its features, and thus could contribute to better 
comprehension of the factors behind the growing time pressure related to parenting. 
Furthermore, the public and academic debate mostly focuses on young children 
and neglects treatment of teenagers. However, numerous researchers have argued 
that adolescence may be a more stressful period than early childhood, so spending 
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time with parents during this phase might be especially beneficial for children 
(Milkie et al. 2016). In addition, findings about the decrease in parental time spent 
with school-aged children (Harcsa 2014, Craig et al. 2014) and Galinsky’s (1999) 
results suggest that it is rather older children who report to spending too little time 
with their parents, underlining the relevance of research on adolescents. 
Furthermore, investigations of family dynamics most often focus on parents, 
and ignore the perspective of children (Milkie et al., 2010; Kremer-Sadlik – Paugh, 
2007). The exploration and integration of children’s perspectives can broaden the 
concept of qualitative time that is devoted to the family, and reveal its complex 
features. This can open up new pathways of inquiry. The exploration of parental 
time can be widened to deepen our knowledge about the factors that influence 
positive outcomes for children and their life satisfaction, and thereby address some 
of the most pressing questions of contemporary parents. 
References
Ashbourne, L. M. – Daly, K. J. (2012): Changing patterns of family time in 
adolescence: Parents’ and teens’ reflections. Time & Society, 21 (3): 308-329.
Bianchi, S. M. – Robinson, J. (1997): What Did You Do Today? Children’s Use of Time, 
Family Composition, and the Acquisition of Social Capital. Journal of Marriage 
and Family, 59 (2): 332-344.
Bianchi, S. M. (2000): Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic 
Change or Surprising Continuity? Demography, 37 (4): 401-414. 
Craig, L. – Brown, E. J. (2017): Feeling Rushed: Gendered Time Quality, Work Hours, 
Nonstandard Work Schedules, and Spousal Crossover. Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 79 (1): 225-242.
Craig, L. – Mullan, K. (2010): Parenthood, Gender and Work-Family Time in the 
United States, Australia, Italy, France and Denmark. Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 72 (5): 1344-1359.
Craig, L. – Powell, A. – Smyth, C. (2014): Towards intensive parenting? Changes in 
the composition and determinants of mothers’ and fathers’ time with children 
1992–2006. Th e British Journal of Sociology, 65 (3): 555-579.
Daly, K. J. (2001): Deconstructing Family Time: From Ideology to Lived Experience. 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 63 (2): 283-294.
Dermott, E – Seymour, J. (2011): ‘Displaying Families: A New Concept for the Sociology 
of Family Life’. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan
Dermott, E. – Pomati, M. (2016): ‘Good’ Parenting Practices: How Important are 
Poverty, Education and Time Pressure? Sociology, 50 (1): 125-142.
England, P. – Srivastava, A. (2013): Educational Differences in US Parents’ Time 
Spent in Child Care: The Role of Culture and Cross-Spouse Influence, Social 
Science Research, 42 (4): 971-988.
Review of Sociology, 2017/436
Esping-Andersen, G. (2009): Th e Incomplete Revolution. Adapting to Women’s New Roles 
Cambridge: Polity Press
Faircloth, C. (2014): Intensive Parenting and the Expansion of Parenting. In Lee, E. – 
Faircloth, C. – MacVarish, J. (eds.): Parenting Culture Studies. London: Palgrave: 25-50.
Faircloth, C – Lee, E. (2010): Introduction: Changing Parenting Culture. Sociological 
Research Online 15 (4): 1. http://www.socresonline.org.uk/15/4/1.html (Retrieved: 
07-05-2016)
Frey, M. (2011): Nők és férfiak a munkaerőpiacon, különös tekintettel a válságkezelés 
hatásaira. In Nagy I. – Pongrácz T. (szerk.): Szerepváltozások. Budapest: TÁRKI – 
Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium: 17-48. 
Galinsky, E. (1999): Ask the Children: What America’s Children Really Th ink About 
Working Parents. New York: William Morrow.
Geszler N. (2014): A munka és a család konfliktusának forrásai az európai férfiak 
életében. Szociológiai Szemle, 24. (2): 65-89.
Gillis, J. R. (2003): Childhood and Family Time. A Changing Historical Relationship. 
In An-Magritt, J. – McKee, L. (eds.): Children and the Changing Family. Between 
Transformation and Negotiation. London & New York: Routledge Farmer: 149-164.
Gregor A. (2016): A nemi szerepekkel kapcsolatos attitűdök a 2000-es években 
Magyarországon. socio.hu – Társadalomtudományi Szemle, 6. (1): 89-111.
Harcsa I. (2014): Családi kohézió. A szülők és a gyermekek társas együttléte a mindennapok 
világában. Budapest: Központi Statisztika Hivatal, Műhelytanulmányok 5.
Hays, S (1996): Th e Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
Hobson, B. – Fahlén, S. – Takács, J. (2013): A sense of entitlement? Agency and 
capabilities in Sweden and Hungary. In Hobson, B. (eds.): Worklife Balance: Th e 
Agency and Capabilites Gap, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 57-91
Hofäcker, D. (2007): Väter im internationalen Vergleich. In Tanja Mühling – Harald 
Rost (eds.) Väter im Blickpunkt Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich: 161-204.
Hochschild, A. R. (2001): Th e Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes 
Work. New York: Holt Paperbacks
Hsin, A. – Felfe, C. (2014): When Does Time Matter? Maternal Employment, 
Children’s Time with Parents, and Child Development. Demography, 51: 1867-
1894.
Kalil, A. – Ryan, R. – Chor, E. (2014): Time Investments in Children across Family 
Structures. Th e Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 654 
(1): 150-168.
Kalil, A. – Mayer, S. (2016): Understanding the Importance of Parental Time with 
Children: Comment on Milkie, Nomaguchi, and Denny (2015). Journal of Marriage 
and Family, 78 (1): 262-265.
Kendig, M. S. – Bianchi, M. S. (2008): Single, Cohabitating, and Married Mothers’ 
Time with Children. Journal of Marriage and Family, 70 (5): 1228-1240.
Kitti Kutrovátz: Parental time from the perspective of time pressure 37
Kremer-Sadlik, T. – Paugh, A. L. (2007): Everyday Moments: Finding `quality time’ 
in American working families. Time & Society, 16 (2-3): 287-308.
Kvande, E. (2009): Work–Life Balance for Fathers in Globalized Knowledge Work. 
Some Insights from the Norwegian Context. Gender, Work and Organization, 16 
(1): 58-72.
Milkie, M. A. – Mattingly, M. J. – Nomaguchi, K. M. – Bianchi, S. M. – Robinson, J. 
P.: (2004): The Time Squeeze: Parental Statuses and Feelings about Time with 
Children. Journal of Marriage and Family, 66 (3): 739-61.
Milkie, M. A. – Kendig, S. M. – Nomaguchi, K. M – Denny, K. E. (2010): Time with 
Children, Children’s Well-Being, and Work-Family Balance among Employed 
Parents. Journal of Marriage and Family, 72 (5):1329-1343.
Milkie, M. A – Nomaguchi, K. M – Denny, K. E (2015): Does the Amount of Time 
Mothers Spend with Children or Adolescents Matter? Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 77 (2): 355-372.
Monna, B. – Gauthier, H. A. (2008): A Review of the Literature on the Social and 
Economic Determinants of Parental Time. Journal of Family & Economic Issues, 29 
(4):634-653.
Nagy B. (2008): A munka és a magánélet összeegyeztetése a férfi menedzserek 
életében. In Balogh, P. – Dobos, B. – Forgács, A. – Nagy, B. – Szűcs, A. (eds.): 60 éves 
a Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem. A Jubileumi Tudományos Konferencia alkalmából 
készült tanulmányok. Társadalomtudományi Kar. Budapest, Aula Kiadó: 389-403.
Nagy B. (2010): Obstacles and supports in women’s career. In Chybicka, A. – Safdar, 
S. F. – Kwiatkowska, A. (eds.): Culture and Gender: an Intimate Relation. Gdanks, 
GWP: 195-208.
Nagy B. (2016): Ki áll a sikeres nő mögött? socio.hu – Társadalomtudományi Szemle, 
6 (2): 117-141.
Nagy B. – Paksi V (2014): A munka-magánélet összehangolásának kérdései a magasan 
képzett nők körében. In Spéder Zs. (szerk.): A család vonzásában. Tanulmányok 
Pongrácz Tiborné tiszteletére. Budapest: KSH NKI: 159-175.
Nelson, M. K. (2010): Parenting Out Of Control: Anxious Parents in Uncertain Times. 
New York: New York University Press.
Nomaguchi, K. M. – Melissa, A. – Milkie, M. A. – Bianchi, S. M. (2005): Time Strains 
and Psychological Well-Being: Do Dual-Earner Mothers and Fathers Differ. 
Journal of Family Issues, 26 (6): 756-792. 
Nomaguchi, K. M. – Milkie, M. A – Denny, K. E (2016): Quantity of Maternal Time 
and Child and Adolescent Development: Response to Kalil and Mayer (2016) and 
to Waldfogel (2016). Journal of Marriage and Family, 78 (1): 270-275. 
Lam, C. B. – McHale, S. M. – Crouter, A. C. (2012): Parent–Child Shared Time from 
Middle Childhood to Late Adolescence: Developmental Course and Adjustment 
Correlates. Child Development, 83 (6): 2089-2103.
Review of Sociology, 2017/438
Lareau, A. (2003): Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life. London: University 
of California Press.
LaRossa, R. (1988): Fatherhood and Social Change. Family Relations, 37 (4): 451-457.
Liana, F. – Wen-Jui, H. – Christopher J., R. – Jane, W. (2011): Time for Children: 
Trends in the Employment Patterns of Parents, 1967-2009. Discussion paper series 
// Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, No. 5761
Offer, S. (2013): Family Time Activities and Adolescents’ Emotional Well-being. 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 75 (1): 26–41.
Offer, S. – Schneider, B. (2011): Revisiting the Gender Gap in Time-Use Patterns: 
Multitasking and Well-Being among Mothers and Fathers in Dual-Earner 
Families. American Sociological Review, 76 (6), 809–833. 
Pongrácz T – S. Molnár E. (1994): Kisgyermekes apák és anyák szülői, családi 
attitűdjei négy európai országban. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 
Népességtudományi Kutatóintézetének Kutatási Jelentései (52)
Pongrácz, T – S. Molnár E. (2011): Nemi szerepek és a közvélemény változásának 
kölcsönhatása. In Nagy I. - Pongrácz T. (szerk.) (2011): Szerepváltozások: Jelentés 
a nők és férfi ak helyzetéről 2011. TÁRKI, Budapest. 192-206.
Rehel, E. M. (2014): When Dad Stays Home Too: Paternity Leave, Gender, and 
Parenting. Gender & Society, 28 (1): 110–132. 
Roehling, P. – Moen, P. – Batt, R. (2003): Spillover. In P. Moen (eds.): It’s About Time: Couples 
and Careers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 101-121 http://digitalcommons.ilr.
cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=hrpubs (Retrieved: 25-04-2015) 
Roxburgh, S. (2008): I Wish We Had More Time To Spend Together... : The 
Distribution and Predictors of Perceived Family Time Pressures Among Married 
Men and Women in The Paid Labor Force. Journal of Family Issues, 27 (4): 1-25.
Roxburgh, S. (2012): Parental Time Pressures and Depression among Married Dual- 
Earner Parents. Journal of Family Issues, 33 (8): 1027-1053. 
Roeters, A. – Van der Lippe, T. – Kluwer, E. S. (2010): Work Characteristics and 
Parent-Child Relationship Quality: The Mediating Role of Temporal Involvement. 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 72 (5): 1317-1328.
Sayer, L. C. – Bianchi, S. M. – Robinson, J. P. (2004): Are parents investing less in 
children? Trends in mothers’ and fathers’ time with children. American Journal of 
Sociology, 110 (1): 1-43.
Sayer, L. C. – Gornick, J. C. (2012): Cross-national Variation in the Influence of 
Employment Hours on Child Care Time. European Sociological Review, 28 (4): 421-
442.
Scharle Á. (2016): Mennyit nőtt a foglalkoztatás Magyarországon 2008 óta? In 
Kolosi T. – Tóth I. Gy. (szerk.): Társadalmi Riport 2016. Budapest: TÁRKI: 54-72.
Schor, J. B. (1991): Th e Overworked American: Th e Unexcepted Decline of Leisure. New 
York: Basic Book 
Kitti Kutrovátz: Parental time from the perspective of time pressure 39
Sebők Cs. (2014): A munkahely és a magánélet közötti konfliktus idő alapú 
megközelítése. Kultúra és Közösség, (4) 5: 105-114.
Snyder, K. A. (2007): A Vocabulary of Motives: Understanding How Parents Define 
Quality Time. Journal of Marriage and Family, 69 (2): 320-340.
Spéder Zs. (2011): Ellentmondó elvárások között… Családi férfiszerepek, apaképek 
a mai Magyarországon. In Nagy I. – Pongrácz T. (szerk.): Szerepváltozások. 
Budapest: TÁRKI – Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium: 207–228.
StGeorge, J. M. – Fletcher, R. J (2012): Time for Work, Commuting, and Parenting? 
Commuting Parents’ Involvement with their Children. Community, Work & Family, 
15 (3): 273-291. 
Sullivan, O. – Gershuny, J. (2001): Cross-National Changes in Time-Use: Some 
Sociological (Hi)Stories Re-Examined. Th e British Journal of Sociology, 52 (2): 331-
347.
Takács J. (2013): Unattainable desires? Childbearing capabilities in early 21st century 
Hungary. In Oláh, L. Sz. – Fratczak, E. (eds.): Childbearing, Women’s Employment 
and Work-Life Balance Policies in Contemporary Europe. Basingstoke and New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 179-206.
Takács J. (2015): Aktívan törődő apák Magyarországon. MSZT konferencia “A 
bizonytalanság szociológiája”. 2015. November 20., Budapest.
Tóth H. (2007): „Struggle for Life”: Munka és magánélet egyensúlya dilemmái a 
nemek közötti különbségek tükrében. In Nagy, B. (ed.): Szervezet, menedzsment 
és nemek. Budapest, Aula Kiadó.
Utasi Á. (2011): Szubjektív feszültség és munkastressz a házasok életében. 
Összehasonlítás Európa 24 országában. In Nagy I. - Pongrácz T. (eds.): 
Szerepváltozások: Jelentés a nők és férfi ak helyzetéről 2011. Budapest, TÁRKI 
Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium: 243-264.
Van der Lippe, T. (2007): Dutch Workers and Time Pressure: Household and 
Workplace Characteristics. Work, Employment and Society, 21 (4): 693-711. 
Vaskovics, L. (2014): Családszerkezeti átalakulások európai kitekintésben. 
Szociológiai Szemle 24(1): 5–39.
Wajcman, J. – Bittman, M. – Brown, J. E. (2008): Families without Borders: Mobile 
Phones, Connectedness and Work-Home Divisions. Sociology, 42 (4): 635-652. 
Waldfogel, J. (2016): How important is Parental Time? It depends: Comment on 
Milkie, Nomaguchi, and Denny (2015). Journal of Marriage and Family, 78 (1): 
266-269.
Review of Sociology 27(4): 40–60.
Pension system design and intergenerational 
redistribution: applying Musgrave’s rule in 
a comparative setting
Mika Vidlund1–Niko Väänänen–Antti Mielonen–Kati Kuitto
Mika.Vidlund@etk.fi
Manuscript received: 4 July 2017.
Modified manuscript received: 30 November 2017 
Acceptance of manuscript for publication: 6 December 2017 
 
Abstract: Th is paper focusses on the intergenerational distribution of risk and burden of pension 
ﬁ nancing in diﬀ ering pension systems. We apply the Musgrave rule of intergenerational fairness, 
which proposes a pension system to be fair across generations when the system produces a ﬁ xed ratio 
of pensions and labour earnings. By comparing pension system design and the ﬁ nancing of pension 
provision in eight European countries, the eﬀ ects of the institutional set-up of pension systems on 
intergenerational redistribution are assessed, including the key features of the pension systems such 
as the ﬁ nancing and reform trends of recent years that have aﬀ ected their intergenerational fairness. 
By including both statutory and occupational pension schemes in our analysis, we extend the Musgrave 
framework to cover the most relevant schemes for pension provision. 
Pension systems address intergenerationally fair redistribution to varying degrees depending on their 
design as deﬁ ned beneﬁ t (DB) or deﬁ ned contribution (DC) schemes and their mixture of statutory 
and occupational components. Th e current trend in pension design implies less intergenerational risk 
sharing within the pension system and less redistribution from workers to retirees. Our results show 
that current retirees are rather well protected. Th e contribution burden caused by demographic ageing 
and growth in pension expenditure is not directly imposed on current employees, but tax ﬁ nancing is 
gaining in importance in many countries.
Keywords: intergenerational redistribution, pensions, pension system, Musgrave rule, pension 
contribution, pay-as-you-go system, ageing, pension reform
1 Introduction
Pension systems are one of the main components of any European welfare state. Pension 
insurance accounts for the lion’s share of social insurance expenditure, and is ﬁ nanced 
through a variety of mechanisms that diﬀ er across countries, combining both public and 
private actors. Th e ﬁ nancing of the latter touches upon the very core of the welfare state as 
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boundaries between adequacy, sustainability, equality, solidarity and intergenerational 
equity need to be addressed. Th us, pension systems are constantly being debated, both 
at the national and European level, by a variety of actors that have vested interests in 
these issues (see e.g. European Commission 2012). As European societies continue to 
age, pension systems will be of increasing interest in the years to come. 
Recent pension reforms have typically tried to curb expenditure in the near or 
mid-term future to foster sustainability in the face of population ageing. Along with 
increases in the retirement age, most pension reforms in the EU have reduced beneﬁ t 
ratios for younger generations (see e.g. Hüttl et al. 2015; European Commission 2009; 
2015). Pension systems are intrinsically solidary and redistribute wealth across and 
between generations. However, the ageing of populations challenges intergenerational 
solidarity as fewer and fewer working age people are required to ﬁ nance the pensions 
of a growing number of retirees in pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) systems. Th is development, 
together with the recent reforms, may challenge the very principles of pension systems. 
Furthermore, developments in European labour markets disadvantage younger 
generations’ future pension adequacy compared to older generations. Even though 
variability between the EU countries does exist, one of the biggest legacies of the 
ﬁ nancial crisis since 2008 has been high levels of youth unemployment (Eichhorst et 
al. 2014). While the employment rates of older workers have been more resilient since 
the crisis, young people are experiencing problems getting involved in working life 
(see Eichhorst et al. 2014; Eurostat 2017). Th is poses further challenges as regards 
the adequate replacement ratio that extend beyond the issue of demographic ageing.
Th e design of pension systems together with labour market attachment have 
a decisive impact on intergenerational redistribution and future pension levels. 
For example, Grech (2015) and Augusztinovics (2002) state that negative labour 
market developments and the increase in youth unemployment, together with the 
tightening link between pension entitlements and contributory records introduced 
by recent reforms, could pose a serious risk for current young generations in terms 
of their future retirement income.  
In this paper, we assess how European pension systems are adapting to the 
challenges of ageing and productivity described above with regard to intergenerational 
redistribution eﬀ ects. We apply the Musgrave rule of intergenerational fairness 
(Musgrave 1981), according to which the ratio of pensions over labour earnings 
net of pension contributions should remain constant. In contrast to the original 
application of the rule, which only included statutory pension provision, we include 
both ﬁ rst pillar statutory and second pillar occupational pension schemes. We assess 
how the two critical features, productivity development (i.e., the wage ratio of the 
working population to the past wage rates of retirees) and population development 
(i.e., the ratio of the working generation to the retiree generation) are likely to 
challenge intergenerational redistribution and fairness in diﬀ ering pension systems. 
By comparing pension system design and how the burden of pension ﬁ nancing is 
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shared between generations in a selection of European countries, we thus create a 
more comprehensive picture of the redistribution of risk across generations. 
We then apply the Musgrave rule to assess how pension system design theoretically 
affects intergenerational redistribution under challenges of productivity growth and 
demographic ageing in eight European welfare states.2 In the fourth section, we provide 
novel empirical evidence about the actual distribution of the fi nancial burden of pension 
provision and how this challenges intergenerational redistribution from the perspective of 
the Musgrave rule. We conclude by discussing the feasibility of the Musgrave framework 
for assessing current pension systems and their intergenerational distribution effects.
 2 Pension systems and intergenerational redistribution
2.1 Fairness, redistribution and pensions
Pension systems can be understood as insurance arrangements against a variety of risks 
(longevity, disability and a loss of spouse/parent) in which pension system members pool 
their savings to create insurance against these risks. In other words, members share risks 
with each other. In addition to oﬀ ering mere insurance, public pension systems have 
other objectives, such as poverty alleviation and redistribution (Barr & Diamond 2006).
Th e redistribution of pension systems can be both intra-generational and 
intergenerational. Intra-generational redistribution exists in the form of, for 
example, minimum pensions, the computation of non-contributory periods, 
calculation basis and pension ceilings. Intergenerational redistribution arises 
from the fact that most pension provision is ﬁ nanced through the pay-as-you-go 
mechanism, whereby the working age population ﬁ nances the pensions of retirees. 
As generational cohorts diﬀ er in size and systems are reformed, redistribution 
between generations takes place.
To share more evenly the costs of ageing and pension provision among generations, 
countries have introduced both systemic and parametric reforms to their pension 
systems. Also, the importance of funded private supplementary occupational pensions 
is increasing. Another tool for addressing intergenerational redistribution is automatic 
stabilizers that automatically trigger measures for controlling the expenditure of a 
pension system. Depending on their design, automatic stabilizers can defend the interests 
of future generations in the face of population ageing by scaling back pension promises. 
An important issue in intergenerational redistribution is the pension contribution 
rate. If the contribution rate is higher for one generation but the beneﬁ t is not, wealth is 
redistributed from one generation to another. Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) describe 
an actuarially fair pension system as one that equalises lifetime individual pension 
entitlements to lifetime individual pension contributions. By deﬁ nition, therefore, there is 
no redistribution towards or away from any individual. Some countries have sought to move 
2  If a country has diﬀ erent regimes for private sector workers, civil servants and the self-employed, the focus in this paper is on the 
system for private sector workers.
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in this direction by reforming their pension systems towards deﬁ ned contribution (DC). 
However, looking solely at the contribution rate might be a bit misleading. Pension 
systems need new contributors, and therefore individuals with children could be 
understood as having contributed to the pension system “in nature” (Gosseries 
2005). Also, the state’s role should be analysed as it can strengthen the ﬁ nancing 
of the pension system by targeting tax money for the system. Unlike contributions 
that are paid by the employed and employers, taxes are paid by the whole population, 
including retirees, thus sharing the burden more evenly across generations. 
Although an analysis of the impact on labour markets of pension systems falls 
outside the scope of this paper, it is important to acknowledge that high pension 
contribution rates might hinder the employment of young people. Similarly, high 
public pension spending might limit the scope of other state welfare programs such 
as early childhood or active labour market policies due to scarce resources. 
2.2 Intergenerational redistribution and fairness according to the Musgrave rule
Th e focus of this study is pension system design, and in particular its ﬁ nancing structure 
and intergenerational redistribution. To be able to assess the intergenerational fairness 
of pension policy in this context we apply the Musgrave rule (1981) on risk sharing 
between diﬀ erent generations. Th e Musgrave rule provides a useful framework and 
workable criteria for revealing diﬀ erences in cross-country comparisons of pension 
institutions. It has also been widely referred to as a rule-of-thumb when discussing the 
change in the ratio of pension contributions to retiree’s beneﬁ ts, and the challenges of 
keeping these in balance in the face of demographic and economic pressures (see e.g. 
Myles 2002; Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003; Schokkaert et al. 2017).
In its simplest form, the Musgrave rule states that a pension system is 
intergenerationally fair if the ratio of per capita beneﬁ ts to retirees to per capita 
earnings of workers (net of social security tax) is ﬁ xed (Musgrave 1981: 109). In other 
words, the relative economic positions of retirees and the working population should 
remain unaﬀ ected by demographic or economic developments. At the system level, this 
goal can be achieved to diﬀ erent degrees with diﬀ erent institutional manifestations of 
the intergenerational distribution of risk. Musgrave divides pension systems into two 
main categories: in a fully funded system, each generation ﬁ nances its own retirement 
and no intergenerational redistribution or contract is needed. In a PAYGO-system, 
in contrast, “each working generation assumes the responsibility of supporting its 
retirees while being assured of similar treatment by the next working generation”, 
thus it rests upon an intergenerational risk-sharing contract (Musgrave 1981: 104). 
Th e PAYGO systems can, in turn, be divided further into ﬁ ve sub-categories according 
to the form of the intergenerational contract: i) ad hoc provision, ii) ﬁ xed replacement 
rate (FRR), iii) ﬁ xed contribution rate (FCR), iv) ﬁ xed replacement rate, adjusted 
(FRRA), and v) ﬁ xed relative position (FRP) (ibid.). Th e type of pension system plays a 
decisive role when determining how macro-level changes such as changes in aggregate 
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productivity or the relative numbers of workers and retirees (i.e. the dependency ratio) 
aﬀ ect risk-sharing and redistribution between generations. 
Th e Musgrave framework is based on the simpliﬁ cation that the population 
within a country at a given moment is divided into retirees and employees, the ratio 
of which is deﬁ ned as the dependency ratio. Th e framework has two exogenous 
“shock” variables: productivity and population. Th e ﬁ rst contingency is that of 
increasing productivity, which Musgrave deﬁ nes as a situation where the wage rate 
of the working population exceeds the past wage rate of retirees (Musgrave 1981: 
106). For pension systems with diﬀ erent designs, this means diﬀ ering outcomes. 
An increase in productivity usually means less pressure to increase contributions. 
In theory, higher productivity could compensate for the second key contingency: 
a demographic shift. Musgrave deﬁ nes population growth as a situation where the 
ratio of workers to retirees increases (Musgrave 1981: 107). Demographic ageing 
is aﬀ ecting population growth quite drastically in many countries as fertility rates 
decline and longevity increases. Consequently, an increasing dependency ratio puts 
severe pressure on intergenerational fairness in terms of cost- and risk-sharing. 
In the face of demographic, ﬁ nancial and macro-economic shocks such as ageing or 
changes in the employment rate, pension systems can adapt in diﬀ erent ways. Th ese 
methods include, for instance, changing the contribution rates or the level of pension 
beneﬁ ts. Depending on the system, only some of the methods are applicable. So, for 
instance, with a deﬁ ned contribution (DC) system, the contribution rate is ﬁ xed, meaning 
that the system balances itself by adjusting the beneﬁ ts. In the case of a (pure) deﬁ ned 
beneﬁ t system (DB), the adjusting factor is, in contrast, the contribution rate, while the 
pension beneﬁ t remains untouched. Th ese risk adjustment mechanisms have diﬀ erent 
eﬀ ects on the diﬀ erent generations involved in the pension system. Th is deﬁ cient risk-
sharing with pure DB or DC systems is, according to Musgrave (1981), unacceptable 
and unfair, and as a result, the systems are politically unsustainable under conditions 
of population ageing (and economic shocks). Moreover, according to the Musgrave rule 
of intergenerational fairness in pension systems, the (unexpected) risks that aﬀ ect the 
pension system should be shared between generations in a way that evens out the negative 
eﬀ ects and provides for the ﬁ xed relative position of retirees and the working population.
Th e Musgrave rule has some limitations, too. First, the Musgrave rule says nothing 
about what the relative position of retirees to workers should be. It simply provides a 
rule for allocating the costs of an unexpected change between generations once an 
acceptable ratio has been established (Myles 2002). Schokkaert et al. (2017) also criticize 
the rule as an incomplete response to the challenges of intergenerational equity and 
of intergenerational risk sharing: First, while it indicates how the risk of demographic 
changes should be borne by diﬀ erent generations, it does not resolve the problem of the 
correct level of pensions to wages. Second, it remains silent about the age of retirement 
around which the Musgrave ratio should be stabilized. As an amendment to the Musgrave 
rule, Schokkaert et al. (2017) propose that the promise made to young generations 
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should be conditional: their pensions, as a proportion of the labour earnings of the active 
population, may only be guaranteed under the condition that they adjust their retirement 
behaviour along the increase in their life expectancy (see also Birnbaum et al. 2017). 
It should also be noticed that these considerations strictly apply only to pay-as-
you-go systems. Intergenerational risk-sharing mechanisms are diﬀ erent within 
funded schemes. In the case of a funded DC scheme based on individual accounts, 
the retirement beneﬁ t of a worker is equivalent to the capital accumulated by his/her 
own contributions adjusted to his/her life-expectancy at retirement. Th ese schemes 
are therefore intrinsically unable to achieve intergenerational risk sharing. However, 
within funded DB schemes, intergenerational risk-sharing mechanisms are similar to 
those of the pay-as-you-go DB schemes, with increasing longevity leading to increased 
liabilities and ultimately increased contribution rates without aﬀ ecting pension beneﬁ t 
levels, although they are less vulnerable to increases in dependency ratios (Schokkaert 
& van Paris 2003). Furthermore, the Musgrave rule is easy to apply to government-
dominated pension systems, but less so to systems where private occupational and 
individual accounts proliferate (Esping-Andersen and Myles 2006). 
3 Pension system design and intergenerational redistribution 
in eight European countries
3.1 Diff ering institutional design
Th e Musgrave framework serves as a conceptual basis for the following analysis 
of how pension systems diﬀ er with regard to risk sharing between the working 
population and retirees. We include eight European countries – Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland – in our 
analysis to represent diﬀ erent welfare regimes or social insurance models that 
apply diﬀ erent institutional solutions in their pension systems. Th ey thus represent 
pension systems with (potentially) diﬀ erent intergenerational redistribution eﬀ ects.
Pension systems diﬀ er by design and are shaped by culture and institutions. 
Approaches to intergenerational fairness and risk mitigation are closely related to 
overall design choices. Issues such as the role and design of the public and private 
pension system, DB or DC schemes, funding or PAYGO and other characteristics of 
pension systems play a crucial role (see e.g. Kruse et al. 1997; Kruse 2000; Sørensen 
et. al 2016). Musgrave’s original focus is on public pensions, but pension provision 
in most of the European welfare states is a varying mixture of public and private 
schemes. Th erefore, intergenerational fairness should be evaluated against the 
framework of overall pension provision, as we have done in this paper. 
In this study, we investigate public ﬁ rst pillar schemes and occupational second 
pillar schemes. We exclude private pension saving, third pillar schemes, from the 
scope of our study. Th ese do not directly produce intergenerational risk sharing due to 
their individualized nature, although they might if there are signiﬁ cant tax incentives 
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for supporting these products.3 By occupational pensions we refer to pension 
arrangements that are traditionally negotiated between labour market parties who 
decide on the crucial features of the system. By public pensions we refer to pensions 
that are statutory and usually involve parliamentary decisions with respect to major 
changes to the system. By using this categorization we can roughly divide countries 
into two groups: single pillar and multi-pillar countries. Our division of countries is 
based on contribution incomes and the coverage of employees in collective occupational 
pension schemes. Data are taken from a recent study (Vidlund et al. 2016).
Th e importance of occupational pensions varies when the focus is the aggregate 
level of contribution incomes (Figure 1). Occupational pensions are signiﬁ cant in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, which are prototypical Beveridgean countries, 
and where public pensions provide a universal ﬂ at-rate pension. Th ey are also of 
signiﬁ cant importance in Switzerland where, despite being earnings-related, ﬁ rst 
pillar pension scheme provide in practice only ﬂ at rate beneﬁ ts to all, whether they 
work or not. In Sweden and France the role of occupational pensions is to complement 
earnings-related public beneﬁ ts. 
Figure 1. Share of occupational and statutory pensions (2014) (% of total contribution income) 
Source: Vidlund et al. 2016.
3  Th e choice of the public–private mix has in general signiﬁ cant implications for the issue of intergenerational risk sharing. 
However, from an intergenerational perspective, the public-private mix in pension schemes is not an issue per se if appropriate 
regulation obliges the collectively privately funded schemes to integrate an intergenerational risk-sharing element in their set-up 
(Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003).
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In Austria and Finland, the scope and generosity of statutory pensions have left 
little room for the development of occupational pensions. Germany belongs to the 
same group, although the role of statutory pensions is diminishing and it has been 
projected that occupational pensions will grow in importance.  
In the multi-pillar countries of our sample, occupational schemes cover around 
90 percent of employees. In Switzerland and France occupational pension schemes 
are mandatory. In Sweden, Denmark and Netherlands occupational schemes are 
not mandatory, but in reality are part of collective labour agreements and therefore 
most often included as de facto mandatory arrangements. 
3.2 Distribution of risk between the working age population and retirees
While Musgrave’s approach is a theoretical one with highly stylized pension system 
characteristics, it gives us a good method and a starting point for analysing the 
more intricate and complex pension systems of today in terms of the distribution of 
risks between the generations. Th erefore, following Musgrave’s logic, we assess how 
these macro-level economic and demographic shocks aﬀ ect workers and retirees in 
a selection of European countries that have diﬀ erent features of intergenerational 
redistribution in their pension systems.4 More speciﬁ cally, with every country we 
have included the main private sector statutory and occupational pension system. 
Th is helps us to understand the total intergenerational aspects of pension provision. 
However, as was stated in the previous section, in Austria, Germany and Finland 
the role of occupational pension provision is of minor importance so in these cases 
we have only analysed statutory schemes. As regards the direction of macro-level 
shocks, we assumed an increasing dependency ratio, in which the share of retirees 
rises due to, among other things, ageing.5 In addition, we assume increasing 
productivity and therefore increasing wages.
Table 1 indicates the corresponding direction of the change (if any) in pension 
contribution rate (A), beneﬁ t per retiree (B), average wages (net of pension 
contributions) (C) and the resulting beneﬁ t ratio (B/C) in statutory and occupational 
schemes when the dependency ratio and productivity rises. Th e change in the beneﬁ t 
ratio thus indicates the corresponding intergenerational eﬀ ect (i.e. which group 
stands to beneﬁ t or lose because of increasing wages or dependency ratios). A positive 
beneﬁ t ratio implies that the retirees beneﬁ t from the change while a negative ratio 
implies an improvement in the relative position of the working generation.
4  Our analysis focuses purely on pension systems so we therefore exclude from our assessment the impact that a decline in 
employment or wage sum might have on the overall economy in which the pension system operates.
5  Th is corresponds to Musgrave’s concept of population growth. 
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Table 1. Effect of changes in productivity and population according to different pension 
system designs 
Statutory Occupational 
Contribu-
tion rate 
(A)
Ben-
eﬁ t per 
retiree 
(B)
Net 
wage 
per 
worker 
(C)
Ratio
B/C
Contri-
bution 
rate (A)
Ben-
eﬁ t per 
retiree
(B)
Net 
wage 
per 
worker
(C)
Ratio 
B/C
Denmark
Increasing productivity
Increasing dependency 
ratio
0
+
+
0
+
-
0
+
0
0
0
0
+
0
-
0
France
Increasing productivity
Increasing dependency 
ratio
-
+
0
0
+
-
-
+
0
0
+
-
+
-
0
0
Netherlands
Increasing productivity
Increasing dependency 
ratio 
0
+
+
0
+
-
0
+
0
0/+
0
0
+
0/-
-
0/+
Sweden
Increasing productivity
Increasing dependency 
ratio
0
0
0/+
-
+
0
-
-
0 
0
0
0
+
0
-
0
Switzerland
Increasing productivity
Increasing dependency 
ratio
0/-
+
0/+
0
0/+
-
0
+
0
0
0
0
+
0
-
0
Austria
Increasing productivity
Increasing dependency 
ratio
-
+
0
0
+
-
-
+
Finland
Increasing productivity
Increasing dependency 
ratio
-
+
0
0
+
-
-
+
Germany
Increasing productivity
Increasing dependency 
ratio
0
+
+
0/-
+
-
0
+
Note: (+) indicates increase, (-) indicates decrease, a zero indicates no change and (/) indicates a partial eﬀ ect.
Increasing productivity
A look at how the systems react to increasing productivity and a constant dependency 
ratio shows the mechanism to be quite straightforward with countries where pension 
provision is concentrated in statutory schemes; i.e. in Austria, Germany and Finland. 
Th e rise in wages should result in lowered contribution rates in Austria and Finland, 
as the systems are of the DB-PAYGO –type and the indexation mechanism does not 
transfer wage increases to beneﬁ ts.6 As Germany’s scheme resembles Musgraves’s 
FRRA-type plan with beneﬁ ts increasing according to wages, the contribution rate 
remains constant in this case. Th e total result (beneﬁ t ratio) is negative with Austria 
and Finland, which means that workers beneﬁ t from increases in productivity. In 
Germany, the total result remains constant and workers as well as beneﬁ ciaries 
beneﬁ t from increases in productivity. 
6  In Finland, the indexation mechanism includes 20 per cent weighting on the development of wages, but for our purposes we 
consider this entirely a price-, not wage-index.
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In countries where the provision rests on both statutory and occupational 
schemes, the results are somewhat more complicated. In the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Switzerland and Sweden, rising productivity does not inﬂ uence the contribution 
rates of statutory schemes, albeit the mechanism varies between the countries. 
As these schemes are DB-PAYGO schemes (we consider national pension schemes 
as DB schemes) except for in Sweden, with its full or partial wage indexation, the 
contribution rate and the beneﬁ t ratio remain constant in most cases, with both 
parties beneﬁ tting from increasing productivity.
In Sweden, the statutory system is of the NDC-type (FCR), and with the 
contribution rate ﬁ xed, rising wages result in an increase in net wages for workers 
and increased beneﬁ ts for retirees, although of a lesser amount due to the indexation 
mechanism not taking wage increases fully into account  (wage development reduced 
by a ﬁ xed rate of 1.6 p.p.). Th erefore, the total result favours  the workers as the 
beneﬁ t ratio is negative.
With multi-pillar countries we must take into account occupational pension 
provision in order to grasp the total eﬀ ects of increases in productivity. As 
occupational pensions are in general becoming increasingly fully funded DC plans, 
intergenerational redistribution is weakened. With the exception of France and the 
Netherlands, second pillar pensions in our comparison are also mostly (in Sweden 
and Switzerland) or entirely (Denmark) based on DC plans, and as such this is also 
how they work, as illustrated in Table 1, above.
In Sweden, where both statutory and occupational pensions are tightly linked to 
contributions, the schemes work in the same direction by strengthening the relative 
position of workers in times of rising productivity. Th at is, increasing wages result 
in an equal rise in the net wage, while the pension beneﬁ ts are adjusted only partly 
in the statutory scheme, while within the occupational schemes they remain as they 
are. As a result, the risk-sharing and mitigation capacities of the Swedish pension 
system have been reduced (see e.g. Sørensen et al. 2016).7 
Th e Swedish system is in clear contrast to Denmark, where the diﬀ erence between 
the statutory and occupational schemes mitigates the eﬀ ects of rising productivity 
on the aggregate level. As emphasized by Sørensen et al. (2016), the design of overall 
Danish pension provision can now be situated somewhere along the continuum 
between redistributive basic pension and DC.
Th e situation is diﬀ erent in the Netherlands, where the occupational schemes 
are still mostly DB-schemes (with some DC-characteristics). However, although the 
statutory scheme is also DB, ﬁ nancing methods are diﬀ erent as the occupational 
schemes are fully funded while the statutory scheme is purely a PAYGO-scheme. Th is 
means that, in contrast to the statutory scheme, the contributions in occupational 
schemes are used to ﬁ nance the liabilities of the same working generation that pay 
7  Th is has also raised questions about whether intergenerational risk-sharing via guaranteed pensions is suﬃ  cient (Barr 2013).
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the contributions. Th e beneﬁ ts in the Dutch pension funds are also usually linked 
to funding status and only secondarily to the development of wages.8 Th erefore, 
the result is that increasing productivity neither inﬂ uences the contribution rate 
in the occupational schemes, nor in the statutory scheme. Th e beneﬁ t ratio is 
therefore negative as workers beneﬁ t from increasing wages through the constant 
contribution rate. Taking into account the statutory scheme’s constant beneﬁ t ratio, 
the total pension provision slightly favours workers in times of rising productivity.  
In France, the statutory pension is a PAYGO-scheme with deﬁ ned beneﬁ ts and 
thus, in theory, gains in productivity could decrease the contribution rate, while on 
the other hand the cost of the increasing dependency ratio is borne by the working 
population. 
Occupational pension schemes (Agirc & Arrco) were designed as ﬁ xed contribution 
schemes. Th e schemes are PAYGO with points-based beneﬁ ts. Th eoretically, both 
pensioners and the working-age population share the proﬁ ts if productivity increases, 
while on the other hand they equally share a weakening position if the dependency 
ratio increases. However, social partners, as plan administrators, have discretion 
to adjust or increase contributions to improve the ﬁ nancial situation of the system 
(Myles 2002). Th is has led to a situation in which the level of contributions has been 
increased to avoid reductions in beneﬁ ts (Moore 2001). However, since 2013 part of 
the decrease in productivity has been transferred to pensioners as the revaluation of 
points has been weakened to follow consumer price indices, or less (ibid.).
Increasing dependency ratio
Under the assumption of an increasing dependency ratio and constant productivity 
contingency, all countries except Sweden face pressure on increasing public pension 
contributions and therefore see improvements in the relative position of retirees. 
Occupational schemes, on the contrary, usually serve to mitigate this eﬀ ect.
In Sweden, the contribution rate does not react to an ageing population because 
of the NDC (FCR) character of the system, but the beneﬁ t level does – in eﬀ ect 
placing the burden on the retired generation. Th is means that the intergenerational 
mechanism favours workers, as the beneﬁ t ratio is negative. Th e situation is, 
however, diﬀ erent within occupational schemes. As these are mostly fully funded 
DC schemes, the increasing dependency ratio does not aﬀ ect contributions or beneﬁ t 
levels and the beneﬁ t ratio remains constant. Overall, the adverse eﬀ ects on retirees 
in the statutory scheme are somewhat mitigated by occupational schemes.
In Germany, the pressure also shifts to retirees but only by a reduced amount. 
Th e contribution rate is adjusted along developments in the insured wage sum 
and pension expenditure, and so it rises as the dependency ratio increases, but 
the indexation mechanism (through the so called ‘sustainability factor’) takes into 
8  For example, the largest occupational scheme, the public sector ABP, has not indexed pensions since 2009 due to the funding 
status remaining under the indexation threshold. However, applicable wages have grown almost every year (see abp.nl). 
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account the change in the relative numbers of insured and beneﬁ ciaries, thereby 
mitigating the ageing eﬀ ect. Th rough this mechanism, the additional ﬁ nancial 
burden resulting from the demographic shift is placed on the beneﬁ ciaries, but only 
with a weight of 25 per cent. Th is means that the system places greater demands 
on the contribution rate and today’s younger generation than on adjustments of 
the pension level. However, while the beneﬁ t ratio remains positive (i.e. favourable 
to retirees), the indexation mechanism, together with the rising retirement age, 
reduces the need to adjust the contribution rate when the dependency ratio weakens 
(see e.g. Börsch-Supan et al. 2003; 2007.). 
Similarly to in Germany, the Finnish system shifts some of the burden of the 
increasing dependency ratio to (new) retirees by applying the life expectancy 
coeﬃ  cient to the new beneﬁ ts. Instead of working through the indexation 
mechanism, the coeﬃ  cient reduces the amount of starting monthly beneﬁ ts if there 
is an increase in life expectancy. It should be noted that this mechanism does not 
take into account the change in the dependency ratio through diﬀ erent cohort sizes, 
as is the case in Germany, and also the fact that as it only reduces new beneﬁ ts, 
its eﬀ ect on the aggregate contribution and beneﬁ t rates is limited. In addition to 
the life expectancy coeﬃ  cient, the retirement age will be linked to life expectancy 
after 2027 with the eﬀ ect of reducing the contribution burden in the future. Overall, 
the Finnish system behaves more like a traditional DB-PAYGO system, and in an 
increasing dependency ratio environment it is the working generation that bears 
most of the burden (see the positive beneﬁ t ratio sign in the table).
In Switzerland and Denmark, the statutory schemes adjust to an increasing 
dependency ratio by increasing contribution rates while leaving beneﬁ t levels 
unaﬀ ected, thereby strengthening the relative position of the retirees. However, 
as the occupational schemes are of the DC-type, they play, similarly to in Sweden, 
a mitigating role, leaving the contribution rate and the beneﬁ t levels unaﬀ ected. 
Overall, when taking into account the statutory and occupational schemes, the 
beneﬁ t ratio slightly favours retirees. 
In the Netherlands, the increasing dependency ratio results in an increase in the 
contribution rate for the working generation in the statutory scheme, while leaving 
beneﬁ ts unaﬀ ected, thus favouring retirees. Occupational schemes, however, 
slightly mitigate this eﬀ ect. Even though the occupational schemes are of the DB 
type, the contribution rate is aﬀ ected by the increasing dependency ratio only as 
much as the change in the ratio is due to an increase in life expectancy. If the change 
is due to diﬀ erent sized cohorts, the contribution rates remain mostly as they are 
because the working generations primarily ﬁ nance their own beneﬁ ts through pre-
funding. Overall, the Dutch pension system favours the retiree generation in times 
of an increasing dependency ratio as the beneﬁ t ratios are positive for the statutory 
system and zero or positive for the occupational schemes.
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3.3 Development of pension fi nancing and intergenerational redistribution
Challenging demographic circumstances for the pension systems should have 
resulted in increase in public pension contributions for almost all the countries under 
comparison, as shown in the previous section. However, it appears that an increase 
in contribution rates is no longer as feasible an option as it may have been some 
decades ago. Th e recent developments in the contributions levied from employees 
and employers veriﬁ es this ﬁ nding (Figure 2; see also OECD 2007; 2011). For 
example, in Austria and Switzerland the contribution rate has stayed at its current 
level for close to 30 years. Overall, it seems that a ceiling for public contribution 
rates has been reached in many countries.
Figure 2. Public pension contribution rates (1988–2016) (%)
Source: Vidlund et al. 2016.
Th e phenomenon of constant contribution rates would be easily explained if the 
schemes were DC schemes with ﬁ xed contribution rates such as Sweden has had 
since 2000. However, public schemes are DB schemes in principle adjustable pension 
contribution rates. However, despite DB-type schemes, countries have shown limited 
development in terms of contributions. In the Netherlands, the government decided 
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to cap the contribution rate as early as in 1997. Likewise, in Germany a ceiling for 
the contribution rate was imposed by an act in 2002 with the passing of the Riester 
reform. In Finland, projections for recently established pension reform indicate a 
stable contribution rate for the forthcoming decades (Tikanmäki et al. 2016). 
Limited contribution rates with DB schemes would imply adjusted beneﬁ t 
levels that control for the adverse eﬀ ects of ageing. Th is would have meant that 
the additional burden would fall on retirees. However, as can be seen from Figure 3 
below, this has not been the case, even though adjustments to future beneﬁ ts have 
decreased the need to increase contributions. 
Figure 3. Development of old-age pension expenditure (1990–2014) (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat 2017.
A closer look at ﬁ nancing structures reveals that the public contribution rate is not a 
suﬃ  cient indicator for describing the total costs and the distribution of the burden of 
pension provision.  If we ignore tax revenues as well as contributions to occupational 
pension schemes, we lack important elements that aﬀ ect intergenerational 
redistribution.9 Depending on the country, tax revenues cover a signiﬁ cant share of 
total costs, and similarly, occupational pensions play a large role in pension provision 
through their substantial share of pension contributions (Figure 4). Th e higher the 
share of occupational pensions, the more limited is the scope for intergenerational 
risk sharing, presuming the latter are DC, as they are in most cases. 
9  Furthermore, the use of reserve or buffer funds reduces the need to collect more taxes or to raise contributions, as well as the 
need to cut benefits. 
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Figure 4. Total pension contribution income in relation to compensation of employees 
(2014) (%)
Source: Vidlund et al. 2016.
Th e role of tax ﬁ nancing is signiﬁ cant in several countries, depending on the 
structure of pension provision. It is usually connected to ﬁ nancing minimum 
pensions, as is the case with the national pension scheme in Denmark. However, 
the importance of tax or general budget ﬁ nancing is also evident in Austria where 
additional ﬁ nancing needs for the general pension scheme will have to be met 
through greater government participation (Knell 2005). 
Some countries have increased the use of tax revenues in pension ﬁ nancing. For 
example, in Germany the state’s share amounted to nearly 20 per cent of total public 
pension expenditure in 1991, and reached more than 30 per cent in 2014 (DRV Bund 
2015). In Germany federal transfers (Bundesmittel) are used to cover the pension 
costs arising from German reuniﬁ cation, as well as unpaid periods (BMAS 2016). 
Th e purpose is also to limit the increase in labour costs, which is also the case in 
Switzerland (IMF 2001). 
Use of tax revenues in the ﬁ nancing of pensions is one measure for reallocating 
costs, not only among the working-age populations but also among the retired. 
Changes in ﬁ nancing may inﬂ uence intergenerational equity (e.g. taxes are also 
paid by pensioners, thus increasing risk sharing). In the Netherlands, the share of 
taxation increased signiﬁ cantly after the capping of the contribution rate. Since the 
turn of the millennium, the state’s share has increased from around one tenth to 
close to one third of public expenditure. Several committees and political parties 
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have even suggested further increases in order to broaden the base for statutory 
pension ﬁ nancing, to include the elderly (Goudswaard et al. 2015). 
4 Discussion and conclusion
 In this paper we have assessed key features of pension systems and their changes 
that aﬀ ect intergenerational redistribution and fairness in eight European welfare 
states. According to the Musgrave rule, the risk of pension provision for securing 
old-age income should be allocated evenly between generations, and in an ideal case, 
the relative position should remain constant. Musgrave’s approach is a conceptual 
one and does not recommend an “ideal” model for a pension system. A fair system, 
according to Musgrave’s principles, would be an intermediate solution in-between 
the DB and DC schemes which appropriately adjusts beneﬁ t levels and contribution 
rates in the face of economic and demographic risks. 
We have extended Musgrave’s original framework to include overall pension 
provision, which in many countries consists of both public and occupational pension 
schemes. Our results show that countries’ pension systems currently have diﬀ erent 
ways to distribute the consequences of gains in productivity or increases in the 
dependency ratio between pensioners and workers. 
In public pensions, half of the examined countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Germany) split the gains in productivity evenly between workers 
and pensioners. Th is is due to indexation rules that link beneﬁ ts to wages. In the 
rest of the countries (Sweden, France, Austria and Finland) pensioners lose out in 
comparison to workers. From these countries, pensions are not indexed to wages 
except for in Sweden, where despite the partial link to wages, workers beneﬁ t the 
most as a result of the NDC system with a ﬁ xed contribution rate. When taking into 
account occupational pensions, the relative position of pensioners declines. Overall, 
the position of a pensioner depends on the relative amount of public and occupational 
pensions in his or her total pension. Th erefore, for instance, a pensioner with only 
a public pension in the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland beneﬁ ts the most 
from a rise in wages, whereas a pensioner with a high share of occupational pension 
beneﬁ ts relatively less.
Regarding population ageing and public pensions, only in Sweden is the relative 
position of a pensioner compared to the average worker weakened because of the 
NDC system that places the burden on retirees. In Germany, the pressure of ageing 
is also transferred to pensioners, but only to a limited extent. In all the other 
countries, the relative position of pensioners strengthens as contributions must 
be increased while beneﬁ ts are left unadjusted. Occupational pensions are mostly 
neutral in this respect, except for in the Netherlands where ageing can lead to 
increased contributions.   
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One of the key ﬁ ndings of our analysis is that contribution rates do not strictly follow 
growth in pension expenditure, as could be assumed on the basis of the analysis 
described above. In many cases public pension contribution income is not suﬃ  cient 
to cover beneﬁ t payments, although countries have implemented reforms that 
limit the growth of public pension expenditure. For example, Germany, Denmark, 
Finland and France have met this challenge by increasing the retirement age, as 
well as introducing automatic adjustment mechanisms in a similar manner to the 
majority of OECD countries (see, for example, OECD 2015). 
As we have shown, contribution rates have remained constant for a long period, 
despite increasing expenditures. In Finland and Sweden the deﬁ cit can be covered 
internally (i.e. by the use of funds within the pension system). Other countries have 
opted for increasing the use of tax revenues or even increasing public debt. 
However, the use of tax revenues can be seen as a symptom of an underlying 
unfair pension system structure. According to Musgrave (1981: 109), DB schemes 
(FRR or FRRA) are an uneasy and politically unstable option as the basis for pension 
schemes, especially in an environment of declining population growth. Indeed, the 
development in the Dutch national pension scheme shows that solely increasing the 
burden of the working population is no longer seen as a fair option. Instead, tax 
revenues are increasingly used to maintain ﬁ nancial sustainability and share costs 
with the elderly.  
Whether the increasing use of tax revenues is the best practice for promoting 
intergenerational fairness is not so clear. Revenue-oriented adjustment may lead to 
unwanted intergenerational redistribution, placing the main share of the burden 
on younger generations. First, adjustment is limited to the revenue side and may 
not necessarily translate into any change on the beneﬁ t side. Second, ﬁ nancing will 
increasingly shift from contributions to taxes, thereby decreasing the transparency 
and the degree of actuarial fairness, in clear contrast to one of the current reform 
trends in pension insurance provision.10 Th is arrangement, however, implies 
intergenerational consequences. Th e exact nature of the intergenerational sharing 
of this burden is also dependent on which tool – taxation or debt – is used to ﬁ nance 
the government’s pension transfers (Knell 2005).  
We can also observe fairness problems with intergenerational redistribution at 
the ‘opposite end’ of pension design. Th e problem with a pure DC (FCR) system is that 
it places the entire risk on retirees, which is unacceptable and decreases the political 
viability of the system, according to Musgrave (1981: 104). Th is seems evident, for 
example in Sweden, where the impact of beneﬁ t cuts in the public scheme has been 
10  Actuarial fairness proposes that it is fair that each risk group pays for their own risks. The concepts of actuarial fairness and 
the solidarity principle have historically competed in policy making and the weight of these principles differs by schemes and 
in overall pension provision depending on the institutional design of pension schemes. There is also empirical evidence (see 
Schokkaert 2004) that workers and their organizations are more willing to accept a lower net wage as a result of higher taxes 
if there exists an obvious link between contributions and benefits.
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softened with tax deductions for retirees, as well as changes to indexing – or, more 
precisely – to the balancing mechanism (Anderson & Backhans 2014; Regeringens 
proposition 2015).
In general, according to system characteristics of the countries under review, 
pension systems address intergenerational equity to varying degrees. Th is is evident 
in the non-pure nature of the schemes, as well as the fact that the total pension 
package in each country usually includes pensions from diﬀ erent systems, including 
occupational DB and DC schemes. Th e current trend in occupational pension design 
to move from DB to DC implies less intergenerational risk sharing within the pension 
system, and less redistribution from workers to retirees. 
Improving intergenerational fairness is increasingly on the agenda of today’s 
pension policymakers.  Risks are more evenly distributed across generations as 
schemes are no longer pure DB. However, our results show that current retirees 
are still rather well protected against demographic ageing. Another observation is 
that countries that rely on multi-pillar systems have less scope for risk sharing on 
an aggregate level. Our analysis also shows the constraints of the traditional DB/
DC dichotomy, as many pension systems are turning towards a hybrid version that 
includes elements of both. 
However, the need to adapt pension schemes to increases in life expectancy 
remains, regardless of the type of schemes in both single and multi-pillar countries. 
In order to ensure stable retirement incomes, longer working lives are needed to 
ensure that decent pensions are paid. As the Musgrave rule only considers the 
relative position of retirees and workers, an increase in retirement age is equitable 
from an intergenerational perspective and consistent with the Musgrave rule as 
it cuts both ways: both reducing time in retirement, and simultaneously raising 
contribution years. An issue which is ignored by Musgrave but discussed in more 
detail by Esping-Andersen and Myles (2006) is that such an approach may easily 
produce intra-generational injustice since life expectancy is positively related to 
lifetime income. 
Another issue to bear in mind is that the challenges of intergenerational 
redistribution and fairness cannot be mitigated by pension systems alone, as 
pensions mainly reﬂ ect labour market outcomes. Th e requirement of longer careers 
for adequate pensions seems diﬃ  cult to fulﬁ l due to the current labour market 
situation for the younger cohort. Although pension systems cannot resolve all 
the problems resulting from inequalities in the labour market, they can by design 
mitigate and soften individual life-course impacts and promote fair intergenerational 
redistribution to some extent. 
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Abstract: For thousands of years, our ancestors operated a pension system that modern economists have 
declared obsolete, and which a new system has been introduced to replace. However, this new system is 
beginning to go bankrupt, while the maintaining of the old by the young is increasingly becoming a battle 
between generations. In other words, the modern pension system – it would seem – has not solved, but 
exacerbated the pension problem. But the old principle can still be applied, since the upcoming generation 
does not maintain future pensioners for nothing. Future transfers to the latter by the young have been 
preceded by transfers from that older generation towards the young. Th is means that the elderly are justiﬁ ed 
in demanding a pension from the young, but only those to whom the young owe a debt, and only to the extent 
of that debt. Having recognised this, we can lay the foundations for a new pension system based on the 
equitable settling of accounts between generations, which in principle will be similar to the old system, but 
which provides solutions that are more characteristic of the modern system.
Keywords: pension reform, social contract, human capital
Introduction
Th e economics of pensions seems simple and logical, but it is problematic because we can 
derive from the situation that we may leave a huge (equal to some years’ GDP) pension 
debt for (perhaps yet unborn) children and grandchildren, which can also be interpreted 
as meaning that greedy old people are exploiting the young. Furthermore, the whole 
pension system and the pension economics that support/explain it are a very new 
phenomenon – a product of the twentieth century. Before this time there was no system 
of this kind, although pension-like solutions did exist. But these earlier solutions did 
not produce the contradictions that the present system does. So the obvious question 
arises: is it inevitable that the system should function in this way? It is only possible to 
establish this type of modern pension system along the same principles? Or are only 
funded pension systems reliable, and should we forget about pay-as-you-go systems?
1 The article is based on the paper presented at the "Institutional reforms in ageing societies” conference, Budapest 8-9 June 2017
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Examination of the topic in detail suggests that traditional pension-like solutions 
provide the key to present-day problems. Such systems were well designed: parents 
brought up their children (i.e. they provided them with quantiﬁ able transfers), 
and children supported their ageing parents (i.e. they gave back these transfers via 
reverse transfers).
In the present pension system, it is very peculiar that the problem is formulated 
in such a way that the elderly are ‘exploiting the young’. It is strange because the most 
important ‘capital’ of young people – their knowledge and abilities – were established 
with the ﬁ nancial help (and other transfers) of older people. So it is logical to make 
a settlement between the two parties, and one possible type of the latter involves a 
kind of contribution payment on the part of young people. However, in exchange for 
this contribution, young people should not apply for any reimbursement (e.g. in the 
form of a pension) later in time if they receive this contribution in advance during 
their childhood. In other worlds, an early contribution payment is not commensurate 
with any right to a later pension. Such payments must go directly to those who 
contributed to the investment in the human capital that created this capacity for a 
contribution payment in the form of a pension. Th us, if somebody wishes to receive 
a pension, they can follow one of two paths (or a combination of these): 1. make an 
investment into human capital (i.e. bring up children) or 2. accumulate ‘material’ 
capital. In other words, youth should not be expected to maintain all old people, 
but only those who have contributed to their upbringing and through whose eﬀ orts 
the human capital they possess came into existence, and only to the same extent. 
Approaching the issue from this perspective, the pension system could represent 
nothing other than a kind of equitable settling of accounts between the generations.
Increasing burdens on younger generations
According to UN forecasts, by the end of the century the global population will 
increase such that the proportion of the population that is (now) regarded as old will 
also increase dynamically, almost tripling compared to the current level. Developed 
countries are expected to undergo a similarly proportionate increase, but beginning 
from a much higher level. Th e percentage of old people will increase from the current 
level of around 18% to almost 30%.
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Figure 1: Projected global population aged sixty-ﬁ ve and over
Source: UN, World Popula? on Prospects, the 2015 Revision - h? ps://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/
Interpolated/
If we regard the pay-as-you-go pensions systems that are in place in the majority 
of developed countries as a given, then the ﬁ nancing of pensions will increase the 
burden on the youth of today and future generations.
However, the problem of having to maintain an increasing number of old 
people will not only be felt with regard to pensions, but also by the healthcare 
system. Here too, the healthcare of old people is usually ﬁ nanced from the taxes 
and contributions paid into the system by active workers. We are not in possession 
of dependable forecasts with regard to changes in healthcare expenditure, but it is 
easy to develop a picture based on the ﬁ gures below. Th e proportion of GDP being 
spent on healthcare, although starting at diﬀ erent levels and to various degrees, is 
continuously increasing throughout the world.
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Figure 2: Health expenditure total, % of GDP
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Health Expenditure - h? p://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS
Ageing has presumably already played a major role in this increase, and these healthcare 
costs are expected to increase further as a result of ageing, in view of the fact that – according 
to OECD data – healthcare expenditure gradually increases with age (OECD [2016]).
Figure 3: Share and per capita health spending by age group in some OECD countries2
2 Please note that Figure 3 is taken directly from OECD (2016).
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In summary, if we take the current ﬁ nancing solutions as given, providing for the 
old will increase the burden on younger generations.
Social contract between generations
However, the fact that the proportion of old people is increasing, and that of younger 
generation decreasing, will not necessarily lead to an increase in the burden for younger 
generations. Th ings could happen in exactly the opposite manner: young people 
become more valued as they become rarer, leading to an increase in their incomes, 
while older people fall into poverty en masse. Poverty in old age is not a particularly rare 
phenomenon during the course of history, and presumably this trend will appear again 
in future. However, this tendency is expected to be much weaker than it otherwise 
could be, or rather used to be, within the developed world thanks to the fact that a 
social contract3 was concluded between the age groups two or three generations ago. 
Th e essence of this Hobbes-Rousseau social contract, as it was called and set down in 
writing (Samuelson [1958]) by its main ideologist Paul Samuelson, and which includes 
all generations, including those as yet unborn, is that currently active workers forego 
part of their income for the beneﬁ t of the current older generation, and in exchange, 
the active workers of the future will also forego part of their income for their beneﬁ t 
when they also become old. Th is kind of social contract (which replaced an earlier, 
non-functioning version) was ﬁ rst concluded during the era of the New Deal, became 
universally popular following the Second World War, and became the modern system 
of social security. It has two important functions: assuring income in old age (pension 
system), and ﬁ nancing healthcare in old age (health insurance). A third system aimed 
at ﬁ nancing nursing in old age is also beginning to gain in popularity in some developed 
countries (such as Germany and Japan).
Th e younger generation’s possible counter-strategies
As a result of the above-mentioned worsening demographic tendencies and the social 
contract currently in eﬀ ect, the younger generation of today (and future generations) 
must transfer an increasing proportion of their income to the old people of today 
(and future generations of old people). It is logical that they regard this as unfair and 
are ﬁ ghting against it. What other possibilities exist? From this perspective, it is 
worth distinguishing between individual and collective strategies.
Th e essence of the individual strategy is that young people attempt to reduce the 
pressure on their income that results from ageing. Th is again may take two forms: 
3 Here I have adopted the metaphor of Samuelson [1958] as the whole pension profession did. Hobbes and Rousseau introduced 
the concept of the “social contract” in relation to power, but the logical structure is as follows: social classes behave as if there is 
a valid explicit contract between them, albeit they may not be conscious of it. Samuelson generalised the term “social contract” 
in this sense, replacing social classes with generations. In this sense, the pension system gives the impression that there is a 
contract between consecutive generations. The epithet “Hobbes-Rousseau” was used by Samuelson and was adopted by the 
present author, not considering that the issue was discussed widely after the two original creators of the phrase.
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direct and indirect. Th e direct strategy is aimed at ensuring that individuals need 
transfer as little as possible to the older generation, while people who adopt the 
indirect strategy accept this fact, but strive to reduce other burdens to compensate.
Th e third option, a collective strategy, is to ﬁ ght to create a new social contract 
between generations.
Direct individual strategies
As a result of the whitening of the grey and black economies, it will presumably 
become increasingly diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd loopholes by which to avoid paying taxes and 
social security contributions. Accordingly, the most eﬀ ective direct individual 
counter-strategy to reduce public burdens is emigration, and this phenomenon may 
indeed be observed from the periphery of the European Union towards its centre. 
One such example is Hungary, from where emigration towards the more developed 
countries of the EU is continuously increasing (see Gödri [2015]4).
Figure 4: Annual outﬂ ow of Hungarian citizens to EGT countries according to “mirror” and 
Hungarian statistics 
Source: Gödri [2015], including: a) Eurostat (2015.05.25) from 2009, complemented by German (DESTATIS) and Austrian 
(Sta? s? k Austria) data, and Gödri’s own calcula? on; b) HCSO, Demographic Yearbook.
4 The table primarily indicates the change and rough order of magnitude of the trend, because it was only possible to partially 
supplement missing Eurostat data – Irén Gödri, personal communication.
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Furthermore, this primarily involves the younger working generation:
Table 1: Distribution of emigrants from Hungary according to various socio-demographic 
factors compared to the resident population of Hungary aged 25 to 59 (%) 
Age at time of 
emigration
Hungarian citizens 
aged 20-59 living in 
Hungary
Hungarian citizens 
aged 20-59 who 
emigrated after 
1989
Hungarian citizens 
aged 20-59 who 
emigrated between 
1990 and 2009
Hungarian citizens 
aged 20-59 who 
emigrated after 
2009
Under 20 – 4 7 2
20-29 – 51 55 48
30-39 – 29 27 31
40-49 – 11 9 14
50-59 – 4 2 6
20-39 in total 80 82 79
Source: Blaskó-Gödri (2014)
Naturally, in moderately developed economies like Hungary’s and those of similar 
countries, the high level of public burdens on income is only one of the reasons 
for emigration; the more important reason is the actual level of wages, or rather 
the signiﬁ cant increase that can be achieved through emigrating to a more highly 
developed country. It may also be observed, however, that one-way emigration also 
occurs between more highly developed countries: highly trained young people from 
certain countries are escaping high levels of tax and social security contributions 
(or an overly balanced pay scale) to countries that rake in lower public taxes (or that 
provide particularly high salaries to highly trained workers). Germany is often cited 
as one such country. Oﬃ  cial statistics indicate that, during the past decade or so, the 
balance of migration with regard to German nationals (i.e. people born in Germany), 
which has always been positive (meaning that the “homeland” attracted people of 
German origin living abroad), has become negative.
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Figure 5: Migration between Germany and foreign countries
Source: Desta? s - h? ps://www.desta? s.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Popula? on/Migra? on/Tables/Migra? onTotal.html
According to data from Eurostat, German citizens who emigrate are generally 
members of the younger generation, and presumably also their children. Some 
three-quarters of emigrants are younger than forty-ﬁ ve years of age.5
5 As we can see, Destatis and Eurostat figures contain a discrepancy with regard to the total number of emigrants. The probable 
reason for this is that the two institutions use different definitions, meaning that, to a certain extent, Eurostat “cleanses” the 
German data they receive - according to Irén Gödri.
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Table 2: Emigration by age group, gender and citizenship - Germany (former territory of the 
FRG until 1990)
Age 
group
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
0-15 23 237 24 710 : 29 299 31 557 22 460 21 629 22 220 19 405 19 185 19 298 17 989
15-19 6 191 6 314 : 6 966 7 139 4 562 4 198 3 679 3 280 3 373 3 737 3 411
20-24 16 202 14 433 : 15 133 16 258 8 655 8 928 8 547 7 533 8 010 8 957 8 224
25 - 29 19 971 19 830 : 23 121 25 828 17 073 16 508 15 664 14 290 14 774 17 559 17 415
30 - 34 18 437 17 200 : 19 470 20 944 15 130 14 634 15 607 13 807 14 388 15 739 15 095
35 - 39 19 481 17 888 : 17 955 17 591 12 361 10 749 10 777 10 094 10 598 11 789 11 067
40 - 44 15 155 14 233 : 15 927 17 289 11 548 10 003 9 632 8 189 7 909 8 327 7 262
45 - 49 9 818 9 563 : 11 197 12 857 9 392 8 272 8 340 7 727 7 806 8 101 7 372
50 - 54 7 060 6 431 : 7 154 8 124 5 821 5 548 5 658 5 256 5 664 6 457 6 042
55 - 59 4 640 4 415 : 4 772 5 573 3 989 3 447 3 572 3 473 3 725 4 062 3 788
60 - 64 4 518 3 822 : 3 550 3 929 3 146 2 854 2 967 2 786 2 824 3 102 2 940
Total
150 
667
144 
815
155 
290
161 
105
174 
759
120 
374
112 
303
112 
049
101 
384
104 
245
113 
884
106 
682
0-44
118 
674
114 
608
0
127 
871
136 
606
91 789 86 649 86 126 76 598 78 237 85 406 80 463
0-44 
- %
79% 79% 79% 78% 76% 77% 77% 76% 75% 75% 75%
Source: Eurostat - h? p://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
It is important to note that these are the oﬃ  cial statistics, which presumably 
underestimate the actual level of migration; in the case of Hungary, mirror statistics 
indicate that only about a third of actual migration appears in the oﬃ  cial statistics.
One of the disadvantages of this strategy is that if young people escape from the 
country that raises them – and from their exploitation by the older generation who 
live there – by emigrating, then this will only mean that they will be using their 
contributions to support complete strangers; people from whom they did not receive 
a thing when they were children, instead of their parents. However, according to 
the current pension philosophy deﬁ ned by Samuelson this is perfectly normal, 
and is something we need not worry about. (In fact, two years ago, the director of 
Germany’s state insurance organisation explicitly stressed this – citing the current 
pension philosophy – in relation to Hungarian claims that it is unfair that young 
Hungarians who emigrate should pay contributions that beneﬁ t German pensioners, 
instead of their own parents’ pensions.)
Indirect individual strategies
If an increasing proportion of a person’s income is deducted in the form of public 
burdens such as social security contributions to support old people, it is logical that 
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they will attempt to reduce their expenses in other areas so as not to have to reduce 
consumption.6 Th e most logical step in this respect is if they reduce the costs relating 
to raising children by only having one child, or not having children altogether, because:
• Everything they do not spend on their children they can spend on themselves,
• By saving money on raising children they will not only have more income, but also 
much more time, part of which can be spent on money-earning activities through 
which the income available to spend on themselves can be further increased.
• Although giving up children can lead to a certain emotional deﬁ cit, such individuals 
suﬀ er no ﬁ nancial disadvantage, and in fact enjoy the advantage that the increase 
in contributions they can make (in relation to the higher income derived from 
the extra work they are able to perform instead of raising children) will mean in 
terms of a larger pension when they retire, compared to those who were unable 
to eliminate their (rationally unjustiﬁ ed) child-raising instincts. People who have 
children can expect nothing in return from the children they have raised, and in 
fact experience shows that they will have to continue supporting their children 
even in old age, meaning this is another added advantage of this strategy.
However, it is obvious that if many people choose this strategy then by the time 
they reach old age there will be very few taxpayers whose social contributions can 
be distributed in the form of pensions. In view of the fact that we described this 
strategy as an intrinsic reaction to a situation in which there are not enough children, 
it serves as positive feedback and further aggravates the basic problem, although at 
the community level, not the individual.
Collective strategies – the possibility of a compromise
At a community level, the above-mentioned strategies clearly serve to worsen an 
already bad situation, and accordingly it is expedient to try to create some kind of 
collective strategy; i.e., to force a new social contract through a process of bargaining. 
But what arguments or trump cards do young people have in this bargaining? What 
is it worth targeting at all? Does a compromise exist that could be viewed by both 
parties as equitable?
At ﬁ rst glance, in a democratic society young people are at a disadvantage in 
such a deal, because as a result of ageing, politicians are increasingly inclined to 
take into account the point of view of the older generation, not only because are they 
the largest and most rapidly increasing group of voters, but also because they are 
the most active part of the electorate. Elections have been lost in Hungary because 
of the rational reduction of pensions, and elections have also been won thanks to 
promises made primarily to pensioners. And this takes us in a direction in which the 
6 In her 2005 study, Mária Augusztinovics argues that ageing is not a problem for now, because the increase in the number of old 
people is occurring parallel to the decrease in the number of children, and although the old-age dependency rate is increasing, 
the proportion of young people is decreasing. Accordingly, the total dependency rate is still lower that it was in the previous 
century (which was characterised by a large number of children).
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burdens on the younger generations are continuously increasing as a result of ageing, 
while their opportunities for achieving a deal of a political nature are continuously 
decreasing, leaving them only with individual opportunities to opt out and desert 
the system, such as emigration.
However, at a second glance, if we do not consider those who are already 
pensioners and who are unable to change their situation themselves (and must 
accordingly rely on politics, and for whom as a result it is rational to exploit the 
instruments for applying political pressure), but instead consider those who are not 
yet pensioners, then there opens up a certain amount of room for manoeuvre in 
terms of bargaining. Th is is because – if their attention is drawn to the fact in time –, 
it should not be impossible to get people who are currently middle aged to realise that 
if they follow the example of the present older generation when they too retire, then 
they will only be forcing more young people who pay social security contributions 
to desert en masse, due to which contributions will have to be increased, which in 
turn will create even greater impetus for young people to opt out. And the end result 
will be that, despite their power to exert political pressure, pensions will still not 
be high enough. Th is end result can be avoided through the timely conclusion of 
a new deal with regard to the future and an equitable distribution of burdens. So 
this bargain would come about between the middle-aged and the young, and would 
aﬀ ect transfers between future active workers and old people. Of the generations 
aﬀ ected, even old people are still young enough to adapt to the new situation. But for 
the acceptance of the young people of the future, who are unable to take part in its 
development either because they are too young or have not yet been born, it must be 
well-founded from the beginning; a deal that is regarded as fair by all parties. What 
would a deal of this kind look like?
Collective strategies – searching for an equitable deal
Such a deal would fundamentally involve today’s middle-aged active workers – the 
old people of the future – foregoing certain transfers from the active workers of the 
future, meaning they would have to reduce their old-age income that is derived from 
this source, and (partly) assume responsibility for the payment of certain expenses 
(e.g. healthcare) that are currently also (mainly) paid instead of them by active 
workers.
Th is very roughly determined principle is logical, but what level would both 
parties regard as equitable?
An opportunity for a practical deal 
A practical solution that lacks all theoretical considerations can be envisioned 
by taking a look at the past level of transfers from active workers to the older 
generation, and determining the observed level which we still regard as bearable 
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today. Th e two most important ﬁ nancial transfers from active workers to old people 
are pension contributions and health insurance contributions; the other elements 
are smaller and diﬃ  cult to express in numbers (such as, for instance, savings on 
travel for pensioners).
According to fi gures from the Central Administra? on of Na? onal Pension Insurance 
(see ONYF [2016]):
Table 3: Pension Insurance Fund contribution rates as a percentage of earnings serving as 
basis for contribution - %
Pension insurance 
contribution paid 
by
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
employers 24,5 24,5 24,5 24,5 24,0 24,0 22,0 22,0 20,0 18,0 18,0 18,0
the insured 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 7,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,5 8,5
Total 30,5 30,5 30,5 30,5 30,0 31,0 30,0 30,0 28,0 26,0 26,5 26,5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
employers 18,0 18,0 21,0 24,0 24,0 24,0 24,0 24,0 27,0 26,0 23,1
the insured 8,5 8,5 8,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0
Total 26,5 26,5 29,5 33,5 33,5 33,5 34,0 34,0 37,0 36,0 33,1
The Na? onal Health Insurance Fund (OEP) only publish data as a percentage of GDP (OEP [2016])
Table 4: Changes in National Health Insurance Fund expenditure as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
7,7 7,2 6,3 6,1 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,4 7,0 6,9 7,1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
7,0 6,5 5,4 5,4 5,5 5,3 6,3 6,2 6,0 5,8
Th is indicates that – at least in Hungary – the two values have ﬂ uctuated around a 
signiﬁ cantly high level during the past two decades, and accordingly we might state 
that the above-mentioned “past ﬁ gure” could easily be equal to the current ﬁ gure, 
which we could then freeze as a result.
However, we also know that the above two elements are not homogeneous: 
while in pay-as-you-go pension systems such as Hungary’s pension contributions 
exclusively burden active workers and exclusively serve the consumption of old 
people, healthcare contributions may also exclusively burden active workers, but also 
partly serve their healthcare consumption. However, we also know that old people 
use healthcare services to a proportionally greater extent, meaning healthcare 
contributions must increase for two reasons as a result of ageing. Accordingly, 
freezing healthcare contributions for active workers would mean that old people 
would also have to pay such contributions (and moreover, increasing contributions) 
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for a long period, meaning the proportion of their pensions that can be spent on other 
things would decrease. It is already visible in the above OECD data that healthcare 
consumption by older people is much higher than by younger generations. Th is is 
also conﬁ rmed by the Hungarian data:
Figure 6: OEP healthcare expenditure in relation to one thousand citizens of identical age, 2010
Source: Lecture by Gyula Kincses, 2017, OEP
Accordingly, freezing the part of healthcare contributions that serves for the 
healthcare consumption of old people would mean that the increasing deﬁ cit in the 
ﬁ nancing of healthcare services for the old would have to be paid for out of pensions. 
Th is would lead to a reduction in pensions. If this is something that future pensioners 
can see in advance, then they can prepare for it through planned savings, with which 
they can supplement their pensions. In other words, they can capitalise part of their 
pension services. Overall, and from a functional perspective, this is the same as if 
they were to capitalise part of the collateral for their healthcare insurance services, 
and this can be formally organised in this manner.
But the pensions of old people in the future (or at least, the part that is derived 
from currently active workers) also decreases because we are freezing their pension 
payments while ageing continues, leading to the following situation: the number 
of active workers paying social security contributions decreases, leading to a 
reduction in the total sum of contributions paid into the system, which in turn 
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must be distributed among an increasing number of old-age pensioners. Old people 
can defend against the resulting reduction in pensions in two ways: ﬁ rst through a 
continuous increase in the age of retirement, and second, through savings, which is 
equivalent to the further partial funding of the pension system. Increasing lifespans 
mean that for pensions not to be reduced, retirement age must be increased by a 
greater level than the expected increase in lifespan, or in other words, in a way that 
means the average time spent as a pensioner continuously decreases.
Th is practical solution may seem viable at ﬁ rst glance, but there are a few problems, 
including but not limited to the following two, which I would like to highlight here:
1. Since this solution is not based on principle, we cannot be sure that it will be 
permanent. It may seem equitable now, according to our current experience, but 
this is fundamentally subjective; we cannot be sure that upcoming generations 
will feel the same. As a result, we can never be sure that the upcoming generation 
will not withdraw from this agreement.
2. It is clearly unfair with regard to women who raise children, because they will 
receive less and less from the continuously decreasing distributable pension 
money in view of the fact that, in contrast to men, they have spent a signiﬁ cant 
part of their active working years raising their children and not performing 
earning activities that include the payment of social contributions. Th is has, 
of course, always been the case, but there have so far been additional resources 
available to compensate for this, which will later dwindle and eventually run out. 
In addition, it will become increasingly evident that people are only entitled to a 
pension because they have raised the next generation of contributors. And it is 
precisely those who have contributed the most to this who will beneﬁ t the least.
At ﬁ rst glance, we could handle this situation by examining the fundamental 
philosophy behind the current pensions system and returning to its strict, 
“fundamentalist” interpretation. Th is, with a few amendments, could provide a 
solution to these problems.
Th e fundamentalist solution
Th e pay-as-you-go pension system was eventually underpinned by a philosophy – 
much later than its practical introduction – by Samuelson (1958). Th is was welcomed 
with joy by the system’s practical implementers, because until then they had had the 
bad feeling that they were operating a gigantic Ponzi scheme (Blackburn [2003]). 
Th is bad feeling was dispelled by Samuelson, and everyone calmed down (although 
the bad feeling was justiﬁ ed and should not have been dispelled, but rather further 
reinforced, as has now transpired – but more about that later!).
According to Samuelson, it used to be the case that children took care of their 
ageing parents in exchange for having been brought up by them (“traditional 
pension system”), but this has now gone out of fashion. Because of this, consecutive 
generations concluded a Hobbes-Rousseau social contract. According to the 
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agreement, current active workers pay for the upkeep of current pensioners, and in 
return the active workers of the future will also pay for their upkeep. Furthermore, 
old people will also receive a kind of “biological” interest, meaning their pensions 
will be higher than the sum they paid into the system, because the increasing 
population means there will be more active workers paying social contributions than 
there are old people, and the additional contributions of these active workers will 
also be distributed among current pensioners. Th is philosophy was widely adopted 
(although not strictly adhered to in the sense that contribution payments were not 
generally deﬁ ned, but instead the level of pensions was somehow determined and 
contributions were then continuously adapted to this level), and only one major 
amendment was included. Th is was put forward in a short article by Aaron in 1966, 
who said that the biological interest should also be supplemented by the eﬀ ect of 
increased productivity. Although Samuelson concentrated on the likely population 
increase, he did note that it follows from the model that if (in an extreme case) the 
population were to fall, then biological interest would be negative.
In other words, freezing pension contributions at an acceptable level and only 
paying pensioners a pension that corresponds to the contributions paid corresponds 
to the original philosophy of the pay-as-you-go pension system, except this principle 
has generally not been followed so far. Accordingly, the ﬁ rst failing of the above-
mentioned practical solution can be remedied, and the solution is not diﬃ  cult to 
ﬁ nd: we must simply return to the oﬃ  cial philosophy of the pay-as-you-go pension 
system; we need only put a stop to the lenient practices employed until now and 
adhere strictly to the oﬃ  cial philosophy. Demand for the fundamentalist approach 
has increased steadily with the worsening of the demographic situation, meaning 
the setting of contribution levels and the introduction of the equitable distribution 
of gradually dwindling pension resources. And with regard to the fall in pensions, 
their distribution cannot be handled with the same ‘laxity” as before, but must 
be well-justiﬁ ed. Moreover, according to the original philosophy put forward by 
Samuelson, such a justiﬁ cation is the fact that pensions shall be in proportion to the 
total contributions paid by the individual until they retire, which accordingly must 
be recorded (in a valorised manner, although this was deﬁ ned by another Nobel 
prize winner, Buchanan [1968]). Th is kind of pension system is called an individual 
account, or NDC (notional deﬁ ned-contribution) system, and for a long time I too 
felt that this was the right direction for pension reforms (Banyár-Mészáros [2003], 
Banyár-Gál-Mészáros [2010]).
We have thus turned the above-mentioned practical solution into a for-the-
most-part theoretical solution, and have eliminated its ﬁ rst major shortcoming. Th e 
second shortcoming is also relatively easy to eliminate (and our proposals for reform 
mentioned above include the original proposals that harmonise well with the logic 
of the NDC system): in this solution, pension entitlements acquired during marriage 
would be regarded as joint entitlements in view of the fact that a kind of distribution 
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of labour existed between the married couple within the family, with one partner 
staying at home with the children while the other worked. Th is means that income 
and the related acquisition of pension entitlements are a joint acquisition, which must 
be distributed equally. One embodiment of this could be a joint life pension annuity 
based on this joint acquisition of pension entitlements (I will not go into detail here, 
but the speciﬁ cs can be found in the above-mentioned articles).
So it would seem that demand for the introduction of an NDC pension system, and 
with it a return to the basic principles established by Samuelson, would solve almost 
every problem, but unfortunately this is not the case. Th is is because if we imagine 
a pay-as-you-go pension system reformed as above, according to fundamentalist 
principles, while negative demographic trends continue, them we are faced with the 
following problems:
1. First of all, we have as yet not found a theoretical answer concerning the appropriate 
deﬁ nition of pension contributions; all we know is that deﬁ ning a set value is a 
theoretical solution. And in the case of a population decline, deﬁ ning pension 
contributions at a high level is much more problematic than if the population is 
increasing.
2. In this case, the youth of today knows that if the population continues to decline, 
then their pensions will be even less that the reduced pensions of today’s older 
generation. In other words, if we regard their contributions as payments into the 
system, as suggested by Samuelson, then the (“biological”) interest rate on those 
payments will be negative, meaning it is in their interest to continue to “sabotage” 
this system and use every possible opportunity to opt out and desert. Simply put, 
the Samuelson system may not work as eﬀ ectively with a negative rate of interest 
as with a positive interest rate, meaning the two cases are not symmetrical, 
especially in view of the fact that the original principle would only be introduced 
as a result of a negative interest rate. While the rate was positive, meaning while 
the population was indeed increasing, it was not in fact the biological interest rate 
that was positive, but it was rather the rate of contributions that was set to such 
a low level. Meaning that, in contrast to the system’s philosophy, it was not the 
pensioners of the era who enjoyed the most beneﬁ ts, but active workers.
3. Furthermore, a fundamentalist reform or a transition to the NDC system would 
not have the same eﬀ ect in developed countries with poor demographics as it would 
in moderately developed countries like Hungary. In highly developed countries, 
problems that are coming to a head as a result of a strongly negative (“biological”) 
interest rate can be delayed for a long time by encouraging young people to emigrate 
there from moderately developed countries, in view of the fact that, despite the 
low number of children, developed countries can acquire new social security 
contributions. Th is also corresponds with the intention of young people to desert 
periphery countries, meaning such migration is in the joint interests of young 
people from both highly developed countries and moderately developed countries. 
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Although the price of this is that pension problems become even more severe in 
moderately developed countries (“positive feedback”), according to Samuelson’s 
philosophy this is something we should not be concerned with. In fact, in this 
case the philosophy directly aﬃ  rms their interests, because it states that source 
countries are not owed anything in return for the emigration of young people. 
Th is may be something that we may increasingly state only in bad faith, but we 
should not harbour illusions; this is a position that developed countries will hold. 
And in fact the mechanism of operation of the European Union, and especially 
the principle of the free movement of labour, is assisting them in this (See Banyár 
[2014b]). Th is means that, even in the event of a fundamentalist reform of the 
pension system, in Hungary the pension problem would reach breaking point 
much earlier than in more developed countries.
4. Finally, from one perspective the family approach described above solves the 
problem of unfairness with respect to women with children, which we mentioned 
as one of the problems associated with the possibility of a practical deal, but it 
also increases unfairness from a another perspective. Th is is because people with 
children (including men) will suﬀ er a reduction in pensions compared to actively 
working men who do not start a family and generate a similar level of pension 
contributions. Accordingly, the question arises whether it is equitable for parents 
who have in eﬀ ect undertaken to provide a new generation of social security 
contributors to be paid lower pensions than those who have not done so. In essence, 
we could ask a similar question with relation to one-way migration between highly 
developed and moderately developed countries.
As we can see, one option, a return to Samuelson’s principles, represents a highly 
doubtful solution. Accordingly, neither the practical/pragmatic solution, nor a solution 
based on old principles will be eﬀ ective.
New principle: the equitable settlement of accounts between generations
So we have reached a stage where we need a theoretical solution, but the old principle 
does not work very well; it was developed incorrectly. So what next? What is the right 
strategy for young people to take? Should they strive to do away with the current 
pension system after all, in view of the fact that within a Samuelson framework and 
in a worsening demographic situation, topped with an environment that is draining 
labour out of the country, they can only be the losers of the pay-as-you-go system, 
whether it is reformed or not?! Are young people right to be resentful with regard to 
the social contract that is currently in eﬀ ect, and which is disadvantageous to them, 
and are they justiﬁ ed in refusing to maintain the current older generation on the 
grounds that they are certain to lose out on the deal?
For my part I believe that (possible, or future) resentment on the part of young 
people is justiﬁ ed, but only to a certain extent. Only to a certain extent because 
young people cannot claim that they are supporting old people for nothing in view 
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of the fact that they have received a lot from them, and owe them a lot to begin 
with. And the fact that old people are asking for something in return for what young 
people owe them is not in conﬂ ict with any fairness-related problem. But what do 
young people owe the old? Practically speaking, they owe them the cost of their 
upbringing, because that is something to which they contributed practically nothing. 
In addition, the human capital owned by the child, and which generates income for 
them, was created thanks to the ﬁ nancial eﬀ orts of the parents (and to a certain 
extent, other taxpayers). Th ese eﬀ orts can thus in fact be regarded as, investments 
in human capital, with regard to which it is justiﬁ ed to expect not only a simple 
return, but perhaps also a positive yield. Th ese investments were not made by the 
child, so it is not a justiﬁ ed demand that the former should receive the full yield, and 
should not have to return something of it to those who did make the investment. We 
could also approach things from the perspective that the child invested in his/her 
own human capital, but using a loan from their parents and other taxpayers, and it 
is appropriate that this loan should be repaid when the individual is able to do so.
It is interesting to note that Samuelson writes nothing about this aspect 
of things; in his approach children have no consumption, meaning they have 
contributed zero investment to child-rearing, which naturally has a yield of zero 
(he more or less explicitly states exactly this!). Th is is all the more strange in view 
of the fact that he mentions the motive itself, because he states that this is exactly 
what happened within the “traditional pension system”, which has “gone out of 
fashion”: children supported their parents in exchange for having been brought 
up. In defence of Samuelson, it may be stated that the idea of investing in human 
capital was only put forward a little later than his description of his own pension 
philosophy. Nevertheless, it is strange that the theory has not been corrected since 
then.7 Th ese days we take everything into consideration, but only party consider our 
most important investment, the one in human capital, although pensions are the 
yield on this investment. If there is no investment, there is no pension. Pensions 
can only be as high as is permitted by this investment (and this is something that 
even Samuelson noticed and mentioned in his 1958 article, but only in very general 
terms).
Th e fact that we do not take account of the investment in human capital means 
that we are potentially allowing that capital to escape from us without settling 
7 I have attempted to perform this theoretical correction myself (Banyár [2014a]). The theoretical correction results in a pension 
system, as also described here, that was already “invented” 10 years earlier without any theoretical consideration by four 
authors working (at the time) for a Czech-Dutch insurance company (Hylz et al [2005]). It is important to note that, although 
they do make a positive contribution to the topic, I regard the majority of views concerning the subject of “children and 
insurance” as a side-track from a theoretical perspective, because of what I regard as the question having been put forward 
incorrectly. The question that was put forward is: how can fertility rates be increased via the pension system? This arose 
from the correct observation that the current pension system is a disincentive to having children (see e.g. Gál [2003]), but the 
reversal of the question seems arbitrary, because why should the pension system be required to promote childbearing? This is 
what those who objected to the idea concentrated on (for instance, in Kovács’s [ed.] volume [2012]), because this was how the 
proponents of the idea (and especially the Botos’s, e.g. Botos-Botos [2011]) communicated it. But even the impartial analysts 
felt that this approach was self-evident (e.g. Regős [2015], Simonovits [2014]). My standpoint is that the pension system must be 
impartial with regard to this question of fertility, and I deduce the required reforms from deeper financial relationships rather 
than from the perspective of fertility rates. 
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accounts. (Although, as I have already mentioned above, developed countries are 
happy about this [for the moment] and are in no rush to settle accounts, and in fact 
are shaming those who want this.)
So what we have found is that a correct solution that could be justiﬁ ed in the long 
term would be for the generations to simply settle accounts with each other8, with 
the young repaying the costs of their upbringing to those to whom they owe it when 
they are capable of paying, meaning when the investment in their human capital 
“bears fruit”; i.e., when they become active workers. Th is means that young people 
should only resent the fact that the old are demanding money from them to the 
extent that this demand exceeds the valorised costs of their own upbringing (and 
perhaps a little yield on that investment).
Accordingly, the principle could be set down (in its initial, draft form) as follows: 
we take into account the average cost of raising a contributor (individual diﬀ erences 
do not matter as long as they do not cause an increase in human capital), and the 
repayment of this investment is required by all young people (at some point in 
the future, at a suitable stage of their lives). Th e money that enters the system in 
this manner is then distributed in the form of pensions to those to whom these 
young people belong, meaning to those who have contributed to the creation of this 
contribution capacity, and in a proportion that corresponds to their investment. 
Young people do not owe everyone, meaning it is not their responsibility to maintain 
all old people. Th ey primarily owe their parents (if, as is true in the majority of cases, 
they raised them; if not then they owe a debt to those who in fact raised them), and 
secondarily to those who supported their upbringing though paying taxes. Th e latter 
is a diﬃ  cult issue, but not impossible to solve; it may be estimated to a relatively good 
degree. For instance, we may state that the sum with which people have contributed 
relative to the raising of the next generation is roughly proportionate to personal 
income tax that is paid. And we can calculate the absolute value by multiplying this 
sum with the part of the cost of raising a child that was ﬁ nanced through taxes. Th is 
includes, for instance, childcare allowance, state education, public healthcare, etc.
Th is also means that this contribution is something that young people owe, meaning 
they cannot demand a pension in exchange for repaying it. Th is in turn also means 
that the Samuelson principle of distributing the total sum of pension contributions 
paid into the system into individual pensions is wrong, meaning what counts is not 
what contributions the individual has paid, but to what extent they have contributed 
(directly or indirectly, through paying taxes) to generating new contributors. In other 
words, individuals are not eligible for a pension simply because they have paid pension 
contributions, although they must receive something in return for having contributed 
to the raising of a new generation of contributors through paying taxes.
8 At this point, many will be reminded of the Kotlikoff-Auerbach theory of “generational accounting”, which is concerned with 
problems that are to a certain extent similar. However, my approach differs from theirs, which primarily concentrates on the 
total tax paid by the various generations. In contrast, I concentrate only on how much the individual generations owe each 
other, which only represents part of tax revenue, and also includes a host of services of a non-tax nature.
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All this together represents a new social contract and a new pension system, which, 
however, is still lacking some elements in this current form. People who decide not 
to have children will receive a considerably lower pension compared to the present 
level; this is the price for reducing the burden on future generations to an equitable 
level. However, it is important to note that people who do not raise children, either 
because they never wanted to, or because “things didn’t work out”, have also saved (in 
the main) the money they would have otherwise spent on raising a family,9 and if they 
do not need to immediately spend the money they have saved as a result, they can put 
it aside. And if they do put it aside, and, for instance, the state facilitates this with 
a targeted savings construction, then they can use this money to supplement their 
pensions.
We may state that a pension system based on these new principles would not be a 
pay-as-you-go system, but rather a partly-funded system. Although, if we view things 
from the perspective of content, then as a bad, Samuelson construction we can forget 
about the idea of a “pay-as-you-go” system, because the descendent of this system will 
represent nothing other than an investment in human capital. In other words, the 
new pension system would be fully funded, but participants can chose – freely, within 
certain constraints – whether to primarily invest their capital in human or “physical” 
capital, or perhaps in both, to ensure that they have an old-age pension. Th is also 
provides a measure of what they can expect to receive in old age, and why.
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Abstract: Th e Hungarian pension system has experienced strikingly hectic changes over the past decades. 
Hungary adopted the Argentinean pension model in 1997, which included a compulsory private pension pillar. 
Th irteen years later, during the economic crisis, the conservative cabinet decided to fully eliminate the mandatory 
private pillar (the voluntary private pillar remained). Th is paper is written to assess the impact of the 2010-
2012 reforms, with a view not only to examining the nationalization of private pension funds, but also the less 
discussed elements of the reform package concerning early retirement rules, the disability pension scheme, and 
social insurance contributions. Our main research question is whether the reforms led to a more sustainable and 
more equitable pension system. We provide a somewhat paradoxical answer: despite the lack of consultation with 
stakeholders and the extreme speed of the reform, the overall impact of changes is slightly positive as they have 
improved the ﬁ nancial sustainability of the Hungarian pension system in the short- and mid-term, while also 
increasing pension adequacy and replacement rates. Th e prospects of the pension system in the long run, however, 
raise serious concerns related to both sustainability and equity. One foreseeable negative process is the increasing 
inequality among new pensioners, and the growing share of poor among the elderly. 
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Introduction
Th e Hungarian pension system has experienced strikingly hectic changes over the past 
decades. In the early 1990s, it consisted of a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) public pillar2, an 
anti-poverty pillar,3 and a voluntary private pension pillar. In 1997 the Socialist-Liberal 
1 This paper utilizes some of the findings of Szikra, Dorottya, Abandoning Compulsory Private Pensions in Hungary Processes 
and Impacts. Working Paper, International Labour Organization, Geneva, 2015. The authors thank András Simonovits for his 
valuable observations on earlier versions of this paper and the anonymous reviewers of the Review of Sociology for their 
helpful comments. We also thank the participants of the conference “Institutional Reforms in Aging Societies” (Pázmány Péter 
Catholic University, Budapest, Hungary, 8-9 June, 2017), and the participants of Stream 10, “Pension policies – Challenges, reforms, 
outcomes” at the 2017 Annual ESPAnet Conference (University of Lisbon, 14-16 September 2017) for the fruitful discussions.
2 In the case of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes, current contributions finance current pension expenditure.
3 The anti-poverty pillar was not a separate pillar, but consisted of various measures within and outside the pension system. The 
most important of these were the minimum pension level and the social assistance scheme for poor elderly (időskorúak járadéka). 
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coalition decided to partially privatize the pension system and a mixed pension system 
was adopted that resembled the Argentinean model4 (Müller 1995). Th e privatization 
process in the mid-1990s was triggered by internal and external political and economic 
forces. Problems with the sustainability of the PAYG system due to increases in 
unemployment and inactivity during the transition years were primary. Sustainability 
issues coincided in time with the neo-liberal era of institutional reforms, and the activity 
of supra-national agencies (notably, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund) in fostering the privatization of pension systems in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe (Orenstein 1998). Th e ﬁ nally adopted mixed system included a compulsory 
private pension pillar for the newly employed generations and voluntary joiners, the 
public PAYG pillar, as well as an anti-poverty pillar. 
Th irteen years later, the right-wing, conservative government of Fidesz 
abandoned pension privatization and, within just a few months, decided to fully 
abolish the private pillar. Th e radical nationalization of private funds attracted 
considerable scholarly interest (e.g. Simonovits 2011; Drahokoupil and Domonkos 
2012). Less attention was, however, devoted to various other paradigmatic and 
parametric changes that were also adopted in the rapid 2011-2012 pension reform 
process. Th ese included contradictory measures concerning early retirement rules, 
the retirement age, the disability pension scheme, and social insurance contributions. 
In this paper we ﬁ rst describe the most important problems related to the 
compulsory private pension scheme. We then turn to an analysis of the 2010-
2012 pension reform process, including its nationalization. We also shed light 
on more hidden elements of the reform. We brieﬂ y touch upon the undemocratic 
and precipitous way in which the changes were made. We then discuss our main 
research question and ask whether the reforms led to a more sustainable and more 
equitable pension system. We provide a somewhat paradoxical answer by arguing 
that despite the lack of consultation with stakeholders and the extreme speed of 
the reform, the overall impact of changes is slightly positive as they have improved 
the ﬁ nancial sustainability of the Hungarian pension system in the short- and mid-
term, while also increasing pension adequacy and replacement rates5. Th e prospects 
of the pension system in the long run, however, raise serious concerns related to 
both sustainability and equity. One foreseeable negative process is an increase in 
inequality among new pensioners, and the growing share of poor among the elderly. 
Problems with the Mixed System
Th e 1997 reforms that created a semi-privatized pension system in Hungary were 
carried out by the Socialist-Liberal coalition with the active support of the World 
4 The Argentine parliament approved a pension reform in 1994 which included the adoption of a funded scheme “on top” of 
the pay-as-you-go system. Pension privatization was reversed in 2008.
5 According to the OECD definition, the “net replacement rate” is calculated as the individual net pension entitlement divided by net 
pre-retirement earnings, taking into account personal income taxes and social security contributions paid by workers and pensioners. 
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Bank (see Müller 1995, 1999; Orenstein 1998). In the mixed pension system, 
newly employed persons were obliged to enter a private pension fund, whereas ‘old’ 
employees could choose whether to remain in the solely public PAYG pillar, or shift 
part of their contributions to a private pension fund. Th e private pension tier was 
ﬁ nanced from employees’ contributions deducted from the gross wage, and was 
usually paid directly by employers. From the total 31 per cent of contributions, 
six to eight per cent (2004; employees’ contribution) went to private funds, and 25 
per cent (employers’ contribution) to the PAYG system. Th is means that the public 
pillar remained dominant. Rather than adding one extra tier to the top of the public 
pension system, the private pension scheme was thus “carved out” of the public tier 
(Simonovits 2011). 
It was envisaged that future pensioners would receive roughly 75 per cent of 
their annuities from the PAYG pillar and 25 per cent from their individual, private 
accounts. Th e compulsory public and private pillars were supplemented with the still-
existing voluntary pillar, while the prevention of old age poverty through minimum 
pensions and the previously means-tested scheme also remained unaltered. Th e 
privatized pension system was envisioned to be not only more sustainable than the 
public PAYG one, but it was hoped that it would also generate additional revenue 
by increasing employment, boosting economic output and decreasing the hidden 
economy and channelling savings into more productive segments of the economy 
(Drahokoupil and Domonkos 2012:288-289).
Th e mixed system became surprisingly popular, with around 2.4 million members 
in 2004 and 3 million in 2010 (about three-quarters of the total labour force). 
Most employees (cc. two million) entered voluntarily. One of the most important 
problems with the mixed system was that, due to a largely unnoticed rule, those 
who had some public pension rights lost 25 per cent of the value of these by joining 
the mixed system.6 In fact, the majority of employees who entered voluntarily, and 
especially older generations, lost out with the mixed system. Certainly, people were 
not suﬃ  ciently informed about the drawbacks of the private system, while its merits 
were overemphasised. According to the model of Orbán and Palotai (2005) (who 
calculated using a 2.1 per cent average net real yield from private funds, although 
the ﬁ gure was, in reality, much lower), future average pensions in the mixed system 
would have been substantially lower than pensions in the solely public pillar (ibid: 27, 
Figure 9).7 According to Simonovits (2009:19), losses acquired in the mixed system 
after 20 years of service were between 9.8 and 12.5 per cent, and reached more 
than 18 per cent in case of 30 years of service. Furthermore, rather than individual 
employees it was typically employers who chose a pension fund, and this lead to 
mass entrance into some of the largest funds and an overall increase in private 
6 It was hoped that this loss would be compensated for by the high returns of the private pillar at the point of retirement. 
Notwithstanding this, taking away ‘earned’ social security rights was held to be unconstitutional by Augusztinovics (2000). 
7 Even with an (unrealistic) 3.4 per cent yield, older pensioners would have been slightly better off had they remained in the public pillar.
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fund membership.8 In their early assessment of the mixed system, Gábos and Janky 
(2000) found that besides personal features (like age or labour market situation) 
employers played a signiﬁ cant role in encouraging employees to enter the mixed 
system, even when it was “not in the employees’ unambiguous interest” (ibid:519). 
Experts agree that proponents of the privatization of the Hungarian pension 
system in the mid-1990s failed to address the greatest risk of the reform: the 
funding-gap problem (e.g. Barr and Diamond 2008; Drahokoupil and Domonkos 
2012:288). Transition costs were clearly underestimated as the number of people 
joining the mixed system turned out to be substantially higher than expected by 
reformers. Th us, paradoxically, it was the “success” of the private pension system 
that caused the greatest sustainability problems. Th e funding gap arose from the 
decreasing share of contributions paid into the public system (shrinking from 24 to 
18 per cent between 1998 and 2002) and the ongoing costs of contributory and non-
contributory pension payments realized from the public pillar. As the Hungarian 
state guaranteed it would maintain the real value of the PAYG pensions, the ﬁ scal 
burden on the Hungarian state increased from 0.3 per cent in 1998 to 1.2 per cent 
of GDP by 2010. Transition costs were ﬁ nanced from direct and indirect taxes9 and 
also induced additional government borrowing from abroad (Mesa-Lago 2014:10). 
But it was not only privatization, but also further parametric reforms (such as, 
for example, the adoption of the so-called “thirteenth month pension” in 2002) that 
contributed to the troubles with the ﬁ nancial sustainability of the system (Orbán 
and Palotai 2005:10). Figure 1 shows that about half of all the costs covered by the 
state budget in relation to the pension system arose from parametric reforms of the 
public pillar between 2002 and 2010, while the other half were created by from the 
transition costs of pension privatization. 
8 Private contributions were made directly by employers, and this transfer method “allowed […] employers to influence their 
employees in their choices of […] funds” (Simonovits 2009:16).
9 VAT in Hungary has been above 20 per cent since the 1990s, and was raised to 27 per cent (highest in the developed world) in 2011. 
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Figure 1. Total spending and spending due to the transition to the mixed system provided 
by the central state to supplement the costs of the public pension pillar in Hungary between 
1998 and 2013, % of GDP
Source: Accounts of the state budget, various years
According to long-term projections, the deﬁ cit of the public pension scheme within 
the mixed system would have remained signiﬁ cantly higher until 2050 than the 
deﬁ cit of a hypothetical single pillar system (in the case that Hungary had not 
introduced a mixed pension system) (Orbán and Palotai 2005:20, Figure 8). Th e 
deﬁ cit of the mixed system could not be counterbalanced by the (envisioned) 
increased net real yields of the pension funds, and related hopes ﬁ nally faded away 
with the global ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008.
Th e third group of problems arose from the management of private pension 
funds. At the onset of pension privatization, mutual social insurance associations, 
funds owned by Hungarian banks or companies, as well as multinational banks and 
insurance companies, entered the market.10 As a rule, 4-5 per cent of contributions 
went on operational costs (Simonovits 2009:17), but in reality these costs often 
amounted to more than 10 per cent. According to Mesa Lago (2014:9), administrative 
costs accounted to 14.5 per cent of contributions in 2010, or 3.4 per cent of the 
capital of funds. Th e charge ratio (calculated as the expected decrease in the future 
value of pensions due to the fees and levies paid by members) was estimated to 
reach 25 per cent (Orbán and Palotai 2005:14). Due to such high administrative 
costs, the average real yield of private pension funds was zero from 1998-2005, with 
10 The largest multinational companies who entered the private pension business were AEGON, Allianz, Erste, AXA and ING. The 
largest Hungarian bank, OTP, soon became the leader in the private pension fund market, while ING, AEGON and Allianz (taken 
together) had the largest overall share of the private pension market (Czajlik and Szalai 2005:29; For later figures, see Hirose 
2011:182; Table 5.6). 
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signiﬁ cant variability between funds (Matits 2008). Th e real yield of funds fell well 
below even conservative expectations at the beginning of the privatization process. 
A total of 950 billion HUF (appr. three billion EUR at current exchange rates) had been 
accumulated in the private pension funds by early 2005 (Czajlik and Szalai 2005:36). 
After a boost of more than 100 per cent in 1998-1999, the assets in funds grew by 40 per 
cent annually and were equivalent in value to more than 10 per cent of GDP by 2010.11
In the circumstances of a falling and later ﬂ uctuating Hungarian stock market and 
a high budget deﬁ cit resulting in excessive interest rates, pension funds concentrated 
their assets in government bonds (Simonovits 2009:20). Approximately three-
quarters of the portfolios were held in government bonds in 2004, and the share of 
stocks remained around 15 per cent (Czajlik and Szalai 2005:37, 52).12 
Figure 2. The investment portfolio of private pension funds in Hungary, 2005
Source: Czajlik and Szalai 2006:37, Table 15.
According to Hirose (2011), government bonds initially constituted 80 per cent 
of all assets, which decreased to 48 per cent by 2009. Drahokoupil and Domonkos 
(2012:290) point out that government bonds were often issued to ﬁ nance the costs 
of the pension privatization itself, creating a costly “circuitous” way “to return funds 
to the government”. 
Th e 2010-2012 Reforms
Th e reform of the mixed system was initiated by the conservative Fidesz government 
that obtained a supermajority in Parliament at the 2010 elections. It must be noted that 
Fidesz opposed pension privatization from the very beginning and had severely limited 
11 This was equivalent to 12.14 per cent of GDP (authors’ calculation).
12 Although regulation did not strictly limit this, there was a lack of incentive tofor acquiringe foreign investments, and 
management of funds concentrated on short-term, low-risk investments.
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the role of private pension funds during its ﬁ rst term between 1998 and 2002. In 2010, 
constrained by an internal and external economic crisis, the second Fidesz cabinet 
decided to radically reshape the pension system and eliminate the private pension pillar. 
As argued by Drahokoupil and Domonkos (2012:290), the ﬁ nancial crisis exposed the 
drawbacks of the private pension system and especially the above-described funding gap 
problem. Th is in itself, however, would not have been suﬃ  cient for the ‘re-reform’ which 
was driven by intertwined internal, external economic and political factors. 
One important external economic factor was that the strict EU requirements about 
macro-economic stability provided little room for manoeuvre for member states, 
especially during the crisis years when they faced economic instability. New member 
states who partially privatized their pension systems in fact had the opportunity to 
deduct a gradually decreasing part of transition costs from their budget deﬁ cit (to 
be counted in the excessive deﬁ cit procedure) until 2010. Th e European Commission 
did not, however, allow for the extension of this derogation in the summer of 2010 
which made the conservative government in Hungary rethink its strategy about the 
pension system.13 To balance the budget, the ﬁ rst contributions due to private pension 
funds were directed to the treasury for 14 months (Act CI/2010) and a possibility to 
return to the public pillar was also created (Act C/2010). Very soon (in late November), 
a more radical plan to almost completely eliminate the private pillar was introduced 
to parliament by the Minister of National Economy, and by 13 December 2010 it was 
adopted without public debate or consultation with the opposition. 
Instead of directly conﬁ scating private pension assets, the new legislation 
proposed extremely unfavourable conditions for those who stayed in the private 
pillar. It announced that such people would not be eligible for the future accrual of 
a state pension (75 per cent of one’s total pension) although their employers would 
be obliged to contribute to that scheme. To avoid scrutiny by the constitutional 
court on grounds of challenges to social insurance rights that had been obtained, 
contributions paid by employers were redeﬁ ned as a ‘social tax’ [szociális hozzájárulási 
adó] to which no future claims could be attached (Act CLVI/2011). Th e justiﬁ cation 
for the bill was that ‘those who do not return to the public pension scheme will, 
as it were, “opt out” from the national social security system’. (Bill T/1817:12) 
Members of private pension funds had only a month to make a decision, and ﬁ nally 
97 percent ‘opted’ for the pure public scheme. A year later, private fund members 
regained their rights to make accruals in state pensions but they were not allowed to 
restart their contributions to the second pillar. By this time, however, only a small 
fraction of the formal members remained in the private pillar. Contributions by 
private fund members, as well as all the accumulated assets of former members, 
were automatically transferred to the newly created ‘Fund for Pension Reform and 
13 It seems that the EC feared that, without strict macroeconomic constraints, CEE states would become a crisis zone in the way 
that Greece had. 
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the Decrease of the Deﬁ cit’ (Governmental Decree 87/2011), the management of 
which has been far from transparent.
Th e separation of disability pensions from the old age pension system in January 
2012 (Act CXCI/2011) has been an important though less scrutinized element of 
the pension reform. Th e intention of the government was to ‘purify’ the pension 
system from disability-related beneﬁ ts. Disability schemes (together with widows’ 
and orphans’ insurance) have been part of the Hungarian pension system since its 
very beginning in 1928 (Szikra 2009). Th rough this reform, the re-examination of 
the health status of people receiving disability pensions also started. Th ose above 
normal retirement age (62 years in 2012) became entitled to old-age pensions (app. 
400 thousand persons); all others received either disability or rehabilitation beneﬁ ts 
(appr. 250 thousand persons), or temporary rehabilitation beneﬁ t] (appr. 190 
thousand persons). Th e amount of the rehabilitation beneﬁ t was around one-third 
of the net average wage, depending on the health/disability status of the recipient, 
while the average pension beneﬁ t was around two-thirds of the net wage.14 Th e 
beneﬁ t is only to be provided for three years, and afterwards is withdrawn, even 
if one is unable to ﬁ nd a job. People living with disabilities became eligible for a so-
called disability annuity, which, in contrast to its name, is a low-level ﬂ at-rate form 
of assistance amounting to less than one-quarter of the average net wage, not linked 
to earlier labour market performance. 
By pushing disability pensioners out of the system and eliminating early 
retirement opportunities, the overall number of ‘pensioners’ decreased from 2.8 
million in 2011 to 2.2 million in 2012, an 18 per cent drop within just a year (HCSO 
2014: 5, Figure 3). In line with the aims of the government to “clear the proﬁ le” 
of the pension fund, the share of old-age pensioners within the total number of 
beneﬁ ciaries increased from 60-63 per cent to 89 per cent in 2012, and to 92 per cent 
to 2014. Meanwhile, the number of beneﬁ ciaries receiving non-insurance-based 
beneﬁ ts tripled. Social rights were clearly weakened with the shift from insurance 
to tax-ﬁ nanced beneﬁ ts. Th ere is, furthermore, no enforceable right attached to the 
latter. Overall, approximately 100,000 people were “pushed out” of both systems 
and were enrolled in the unemployment beneﬁ t system (social assistance) and public 
works programs with much stricter conditions for eligibility.15
Early retirement pensions were also drastically reduced (Act CLXVII/2011). Th e 
basic rule was formulated that no one who was under the oﬃ  cial retirement age 
after 2012 (set at 62 that year, increasing to 65 by 2022) could receive an old-age 
pension. Abandoning early retirement and disability retirement schemes was a part 
of the neo-liberal austerity package of the Structural Reform Programme of 2011. 
In the case of civil servants, however, it became not an option but an obligation 
14 The net average wage was 160,800 HUF in 2016 (HCSO 2017). 
15 E.g. in 2013, 25.3 per cent of revised disability pensioners were sent to a rehabilitation program (for a few months) after 
which they were only deemed be eligible for means-tested social assistance if they accepted public work. http://hvg.hu/
itthon/20130321_VG_A_rokkantak_11_szazalekatol_vettek_el (Retrieved: 08-05-2017)
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to retire at the age of 62 (or at the oﬃ  cial retirement age – in 2016, 63 years of 
age). Women with 40 years of rights, however, could retire immediately without any 
deduction according to the new legislation. Th is measure was justiﬁ ed by providing 
an opportunity for women to care for their grandchildren, which would, according 
to the argument, encourage young couples to have more children. Th is way the 
conservative cabinet managed to link pro-natalist aims to the pension system.16 In 
contrast to pension calculations, time spent in higher education did not count as 
contributory years, whereas maternity and parental leave did (up to eight years for 
three children), reﬂ ecting the preference of the cabinet for women’s caring roles.
Th e Fidesz cabinet managed to implement its reform agenda in an extremely 
short time, with the use of procedures considered “unorthodox” in a parliamentary 
democracy. First of all, the government did not reveal its plans in advance, and did 
not consult opposition parties, trade unions, private pension funds, civil society or 
other experts. Second, Fidesz utilized the method of the “individual member’s bill” 
(formerly only used in emergencies) to avoid the rule of compulsory consultation.17 
Th ird, the government left hardly any time for (legal, social and insurance) experts 
to follow up, let alone to analyse its activities and react to them. 
In 2011, the Hungarian government lead by Fidesz de facto nationalized private 
pension assets and eliminated the second, private pillar. Th is way Hungary returned 
to its pre-1998 mandatory pension system, consisting solely of a pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) public scheme. Th e tax-ﬁ nanced poverty elimination scheme remained 
intact. Private savings in the voluntary pension pillar stayed in place as well, and are 
currently encouraged by a PIT tax exemption of 20 per cent. 
Table 1. The Hungarian pension system following the 2011 re-reforms
Pillars Institution responsible Financing
1. Old-age poverty elimination 
(minimum pension and old-age 
social assistance)
Pension fund + local 
municipalities
Compulsory contributions + 
general taxes 
2. Mandatory public PAYG Pension fund Compulsory contributions (24% 
employer + 10% employee)
3. Voluntary private pension 
savings
Private non-proﬁ t funds Voluntary private savings
  
 When the government decided to strongly “encourage” private fund members to 
switch to the state-run pension system in November 2010, it also promised that 
their assets would be held on individual accounts within the public pension system. 
It was also stated that the private pension annuity (directed from the private to 
the public system) would be inheritable. Following the conversion of the majority 
16 This argument fails, however, if we consider that childless women can equally take part in the Women 40 scheme.
17 Later, Fidesz used this method for nearly all important decisions of parliament, including the enactment of the new constitution. 
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of private fund members and their annuities to the public pillar, Prime Minister 
Orbán declared that individual accounts would be established in the course of year 
2011.18 Th ese promises have not been fulﬁ lled at all, and individual accounts within 
the public pension scheme have not been established as of the time of writing (May 
2017). 
The official retirement age, as described earlier, was raised and was made 
quite rigid in 2011 with limited or no possibility for early retirement, and in some 
cases (civil servants) also of later retirement. The retirement age is gradually 
being further raised (by approximately six months every year) from 62 years in 
2015 to 65 years in 2022. The following table shows the gradual increase in the 
retirement age: 
Table 2. The gradual increase of the retirement age in Hungary, as set in 2011
Year of birth Retirement age
1952 62
1953, 1954 63
1955, 1956 64
1957 65
Source: Act LXXXI of 1997, §18. 
Pensions are calculated on the basis of average net wages acquired since 1988, 
valorised to the year before retirement. One needs at least 20 years of contributions 
to receive a full pension; that is, to be eligible for the guaranteed minimum pension, 
and above a 50 per cent replacement rate. People with 15 years of contributions can 
also receive pensions, but at a very low level, with no guaranteed minimum pension. 
Replacement rates increase in line with the number of contributory years. An eighty 
per cent replacement rate can be reached with 40 years of contributions. Extra years 
of service are awarded a yearly two per cent increase; in this way one could obtain 
100 per cent of one’s former average wage with 50 or more contributory years. In 
the case that one postpones retirement to later than the oﬃ  cial retirement age, a 
monthly bonus of 0.5 per cent of the originally calculated pension is provided. Most 
pensioners retire after around 35-40 years of service, and thus receive reasonably 
high relative beneﬁ ts (see below). Th ere is no possibility, however, for civil servants 
to work longer than the statutory retirement age, except for medical doctors, 
researchers and university teachers. 
18 http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/hirek/20110202-orban-viktor-miniszterelnok-sajtotajekoztatot-tart-szerdan-a-parlamentben.
html (Retrieved: 08-05-2017)
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Table 3. Replacement rates according to the number of contributory years in Hungary, 2015
Contributory years Replacement rate (% of average monthly wage)
15 43
20 53
25 63
30 68
36 74
40 80
45 90
50 or more 100
Source: Act LXXXI of 1997, Appendix 2. 
Th e Impact of the 2011 Re-reforms
Macroeconomic and Fiscal Impacts 
As analysed above, budgetary support for the pension system sharply increased following 
the privatization in 1997 due to the transition costs and the decrease in pension 
contribution rates in parallel with the increase in relative pension levels (from 2002) 
until 2009. In this year, the thirteenth month pension was eliminated, decreasing state 
support for the pension system immediately (Figure 1). In 2010/2011 private pension 
contributions were channelled to the public pension system, which further eased the 
burden on the budget. Th e nationalization of private pension assets in 2011, together 
with the elimination of early retirement schemes and disability pension schemes 
(the “proﬁ le clearing” of the pension system), together contributed to the complete 
elimination of the ﬁ scal burden on the state budget in the short run. In fact, the public 
pension fund has had a surplus and contributed to the state budget since 2013. 
Figure 3. The value of central state ﬁ nancing arising from transition to the mixed pension 
system in Hungary, 1998-2013, % of GDP
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While no oﬃ  cial calculations exists about the long-term eﬀ ects of the re-reform, 
according to earlier legislation relating to the state budget (Act XXXVIII/1992, 
§86), the yearly discharge of the implementation of the state budget was required 
to include long-term calculations about the pension system using the demographic 
and labour market prognoses of the Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃ  ce (HCSO). 
Figure 4 shows the 2010, 2011 and 2012 prognoses concerning the sustainability of 
the Hungarian pension system.19 It highlights the fact that, according to the Fidesz 
government, the revenues and expenditures of the pension fund (excluding other 
resources) will be balanced until 2030, and a sharp decline is envisioned for the 
years following 2040 due to demographic factors (the eﬀ ect of low fertility rates 
and increasing life expectancy) and economic factors (more people with scattered 
working records start to retire). As the ﬁ gure also shows, the 2012 post-reform 
prognosis has been much less optimistic than that of 2011. A similar conclusion is 
drawn by Freuenberg et. al. (2016:59), who claim that the pension system will be 
more or less balanced until 2035, while later on it will turn into a deﬁ cit, reaching 
4-5 per cent of GDP between 2060 and 2040.
Figure 4. Yearly prognoses (2010, 2011, 2013) of the Hungarian government about the long-
term sustainability of the pension system for the period of 1998-2060. (Contributions minus 
pension expenditures, % of GDP) 
Source: Own calculations based on the appendix of the Law on Central State Budget, various years
Th e nationalization of private pension assets contributed to a temporary decrease 
in government debt by ﬁ ve per cent between the ﬁ rst and the second quarters of 
2011 (Figure 5). It is estimated that about half of the amount of assets was spent 
on decreasing the budget deﬁ cit, which dropped to a record low 1.9 per cent in 
2012, as compared to 4 per cent in the EU27 (HCSO 2013). However, due to various 
19 According to the new legislation on the state budget (Act CXCV/2011, §22), no long-term projections musneedt be made any 
more, but only a three-year short-term prognosis about pension sustainability should be included in the plan for the budget.
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transactions and economic processes (including the devaluation of the Hungarian 
Forint) the explicit debt of the Hungarian state has not been reduced successfully 
and reached 82.4 per cent of GDP by 2013, the same proportion as in 2010 (Eurostat 
2013). Furthermore, as has been pointed out by e.g. Banyár (2017), the hitherto 
explicit debt of the state was now transferred into implicit debt. 
Figure 5. Quarterly report on government debt, % of GDP
Th e capital of the Pension Reform and Debt Reduction Fund, established by the 
government to handle the incoming assets of the private pension funds, sharply 
decreased right after the nationalization of pension funds due to the withdrawal 
of state bonds transferred from private funds to the state (Figure 6). Half of all the 
assets that were kept in state bonds were immediately withdrawn once they arrived 
in the coﬀ ers of the Hungarian state. Th e fund used the majority of its assets to 
decrease government debt, and, from this amount 243 billion HUF (0.85 per cent of 
GDP) was used to pay back a loan from the IMF, and a further 81.3 billion HUF (0.27 
per cent of GDP) was used to take over the debt of local governments. Furthermore, 
the fund paid 95.6 billion HUF directly to the treasury (0.34 per cent of GDP) and 
363.4 billion HUF to the public Pension Fund (1.28 per cent of GDP) in 2011. Shares 
in the Hungarian oil company MOL were also purchased so as to acquire a majority 
from Russian stakeholders. 
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Figure 6. Nominal Value of Assets of the Pension Reform and Debt Reduction Fund in 
Hungary (billion HUF) 
Source: Own calculation based on ﬁ gures of the Government Debt Management Agency [ÁKK], various years
 
Coverage, Replacement Rates, Adequacy and Equity
No valuable overall eﬀ ect of the re-reform can be identiﬁ ed in connection with the 
general rates of coverage. Th ere has been a substantial shift, however, within the 
pension system due to the elimination of disability pensions. Replacement rates 
have somewhat increased following the re-reform process (Figure 7).20 Nonetheless, 
this cannot be considered an eﬀ ect of nationalization, but can rather be attributed 
to other paradigmatic and parametric reforms caused by the 2011 reform package 
(the elimination of disability pensions, a decrease in progressivity in calculating 
pensions, cessation of contributions and pension level ceilings and the introduction 
of beneﬁ cial retirement options for women). Th e elimination of the progressivity of 
PIT further increases the variability in the level of new pensions (Simonovits 2017).
20 The spectacular wage hikes of 2016 and 2017 might again decrease replacement rates.
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Figure 7. Aggregate replacement rate of old-age pensions in Hungary, 2005-2016
Source: Eurostat 2016
Th e adequacy of the level of pensions has been relatively positive in Hungary if calculated 
as aggregate replacement rates both compared to other Central and Eastern European 
countries (Figure 8) and in relation to other EU member states (HCSO 2014).21
Figure 8. Aggregate replacement rate of old-age pensions in Hungary and in CEE countries
Source: Eurostat 2016
While the aggregate replacement rates show improvement, when calculated in 
Purchasing Power Parity, Hungary is located within the last quarter of EU member 
states, indicating the relative disadvantage of Hungarian pensioners compared to 
their European counterparts. 
21 Decision makers recently considered reducing the relatively high replacement rates, buting the no measures have been taken yet.
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Figure 9. The annual amount of old age pension per pensioner purchasing power parity in 
2013 (PPS/Person)
Source: HCSO 2014
Th e largest number of present pensioners (around 1.1 million people) retired with 
35-45 years of contributions, and most typically pensions of between 110 and 130 
thousand HUF (352 to 416 EUR). Th e average pension was 115 thousand HUF (368 
EUR) in 2014, 75 per cent of the net average wage in 2014 (154,500 HUF or 495 EUR).
Figure 10. The number of pensioners according to the number of contributory years in Hungary, 2017 
Source: Own calculations based on data of ONYF, 2017
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An important though less visible parametric change has been the gradual increase 
and ﬁ nal elimination of the ceiling on pension contributions and pension levels 
which furthered the increase in inequality among newly retired old-age pensioners. 
Th e ceiling of contributions was introduced in 1992, and in the ﬁ rst years was set 
at 300 per cent of the gross average wage. In the following decades, the ceiling 
oscillated between 161 per cent (in 2002) and 311 per cent (in 2009) of the gross 
average wage.22 Since 2013, pension levels have been set according to the total wage, 
whereas for other years they were calculated according to the diﬀ erent ceilings. 
Another gradual, no less important change has also contributed to increasing 
the inequality of pension levels. Progressive calculation, a method of increasing 
solidarity within the pension system, was a tool which had substantial eﬀ ects in 
the early 1990s as it involved lower incomes as well, but it gradually declined in 
signiﬁ cance since 1998 and as of 2013 was de facto eliminated – only 0.5 per cent of 
pensions were calculated using this process after this date due to the high level of 
net wages above which progression has to be used (see also Simonovits 2017). Th is 
elimination of the progressive calculation of pensions and cessation of progressivity 
in the PIT system together point in the same direction: towards the massive 
polarization of pension levels. 
Besides the above-mentioned more or less hidden parametric changes, the most 
important factor that is contributing to the already observable increase in pension 
inequality is related to the changing pre-retirement labour market position of new 
pensioners. In the forthcoming years, an increasing share of new pensioners will 
have fragmented careers because many of them will have made their contributions 
under the new capitalist democracy, with periodically high levels of unemployment 
and low employment rates. In other words, a decrease in the share of new pensioners’ 
work record will be associated with the state-socialist period that secured (and 
obliged) employment. Th is changing pattern of work records that overwhelmingly 
aﬀ ects people who have a lower level of education will be coupled with the eliminated 
ceiling and lack of progressive calculation, which together will inevitably strongly 
increase pension inequalities in future years. Th is change can already be seen in 
Figure 11, which shows that between 2010 and 2016 the number of pensioners who 
received a low-level pension increased in parallel with the boost in the number of 
pensioners obtaining very high pensions of above 200,000 HUF (641 EUR), which 
translates to 114 per cent of the average net wage in 2016.
22 Lately, the ceiling has remained stable at around 300 per cent. When calculating pensions, each of the yearly ceilings was used 
(every year a different ceiling was applied to the yearly average wages of employees).
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Figure 11. The number of old-age pensioners according to the amount of beneﬁ ts in 
Hungary, 2010 and 2016
Source: Own calculations based on data of ONYF, 2017
As men are overrepresented among high income earners and women among low 
earners (due to their lower wages and generally shorter employment records), we also 
foresee increasing pension-related gender inequality. While the Women 40 programme 
positively discriminated in favour of women in terms of pension age, this did not lead 
to an increase in their pensions. Th e new legislation to ban the employment of civil 
servants of above oﬃ  cial retirement age also aﬀ ects women to a disproportionate 
extent as they are overrepresented in the public sphere. Working longer years thus 
also contributes to the higher pensions of men. In fact, while the overall share of male 
pensioners was 37.1 per cent in 2016, the share of men among the top 5 per cent of 
pensioners was 66.2 per cent (ONYF 2017). Figure 13 also shows that most women 
earned below the median pension, while most men received above the median pension. 
Th is gender diﬀ erence in pension levels is very likely to further increase in the future. 
Figure 12. Number of old-age pensioners according to amount of pension and gender in 
Hungary, 2016
Source: Own calculations based on data of ONYF, 2017.
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Another factor that contributes to the increasing inequality among pensioners is that the 
minimum pension level was frozen in 2008 and has not been increased up to the time of 
writing of this paper (June 2017).23 Th e minimum pension is 28,500 HUF (appr. 95 EUR), 
one-third of the net average wage in 2016. Figure 13 shows that while average pensions 
have been adjusted for inﬂ ation, the minimum pension has not been indexed at all.
Figure 13. The amount of the minimum pension in terms of the average pension (%), 2000-2016 
Source: Own calculations based on data of ONYF, 2017.
Th ere are, however, only a few hundred people on minimum pensions in Hungary, 
and the majority receive beneﬁ ts of a value similar to the average pension (see Figure 
12). Around 6,000 people (who do not fulﬁ l the criteria for old age pensions) are 
eligible for elderly persons’ social assistance. Th is number is likely to rise in the 
future because of the incoming cohort with fragmented labour market records. 
Due to high coverage rates and relatively beneﬁ cial replacement rates, the share 
of elderly people living in poverty has traditionally been low in Hungary. Four per 
cent of people over 65 years of age were living in relative income poverty in Hungary 
(below 60 per cent of the median income) right after the pension reform in 2013, as 
opposed to 14 per cent of middle-aged persons (between 25 and 54 years of age) and 
23 per cent of children. While the share of poor children has somewhat decreased 
recently (19.9 per cent; still among the highest level within the EU), the share of 
poor elderly slightly increased to 6.8 per cent (HCSO 2015: 21). 
Conclusion
Th e Hungarian government partially privatized the pension system in 1997, obliging 
young people to enter the mixed pension scheme while making this optional for 
23 The reason for this is that all forms of social assistance are calculated as a percentage of the minimum pension in Hungary, 
including unemployment benefits. 
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other employees. Th e designers of the mixed pension system overestimated its 
possible positive eﬀ ects, and at the same time downplayed its drawbacks. Th e 
greatest problems arose from the increase in the cost of the transition from a 
fully PAYG public to a mixed pension system, and high operating costs. External 
pressures, including the global ﬁ nancial crisis, the strict macroeconomic conditions 
of the EU, and Hungary’s borrowing from the EU, WB and IMF, as well as the internal 
political and economic situation, lead to the decision to re-reform in 2011. Th e most 
important driver of the reform was the cabinet’s intention to reduce the budget 
deﬁ cit and public debt, while getting rid of the international control of the IMF and 
the EU with a view to fulﬁ lling its political and economic aims. 
Th e reform process was far from democratic and transparent. Measures were 
introduced at extreme speed without public consultation. Trade unions, civil society 
groups, private pension funds and experts were not consulted, and no compromise 
was sought with opposition parties. Th e reform was legally designed as if former 
private fund members could freely choose whether to stay in the private pension 
pillar or opt for the public PAYG pillar. In fact, the circumstances for staying in were 
so unfavourable (the loss of a state pension in the future with no compensation if 
one stayed in the private pillar) that 97 per cent of people “opted” to return to the 
monopillar public scheme. 
Resistance to the re-reform was surprisingly weak, despite the fact that private 
pension assets were overwhelmingly utilized for non-pension purposes like 
decreasing government debt. Th e government also failed to fulﬁ l its promise to 
create individual accounts. No proper calculations or modelling were revealed by the 
cabinet and the impact of the changes was not properly evaluated. No transparent 
information about the use of the assets was communicated to contributors or 
beneﬁ ciaries.
However surprising it may sound, the overall impact of the re-reform is slightly 
positive, as it improved the ﬁ nancial sustainability of the Hungarian pension system 
and increased pension adequacy in the short- and mid-term. Th e improvement in the 
old-age pension system (that in fact led to a temporary surplus) was achieved through 
the exclusion of disability pensions from the system, and the complete elimination 
of early retirement possibilities. In other words, stabilizing the old-age pensions 
of people with a good labour market position was accomplished at the expense of 
the most vulnerable workers; that is, people with decreased labour capacities such 
as those with injuries, disabilities and long-term illnesses. If we account for the 
decrease in social rights of the above groups, the overall picture becomes gloomier.
Other measures also have led to contradictory outcomes. For example, while the 
positive discrimination of women in terms of retirement age improved solidarity 
between women and men, the cessation of the cap on contributions, and implicitly 
on pension levels, and the elimination of progressive income taxation together 
with the freezing of the minimum pension level increased the inequality within the 
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system. Th ere is a danger that the transformation of the employers’ contribution into 
a “social tax” generally weakened enforceable social rights. Hungarian pensioners, 
however, enjoy rather favourable coverage rates and average pension levels and thus 
are much less exposed to poverty than younger generations. 
Taking the longer perspective, Hungary, after an intermezzo of 13 years, has 
returned to the old PAYG system created after the Second World War. Th ere is 
not much chance that the country will depart from this path in the near future, 
especially now that the currently existing pension system based on a public and a 
voluntary pillar was incorporated into the 2011 Fundamental Law.24 However, the 
prospects of the pension system in the long run raise some concerns, as reserves for 
future pensions have been used for other purposes in past years, while demographic 
processes and the meagre employment rates of people with low education levels 
suggest problems with adequacy that have not been addressed by Hungarian 
governments of the past quarter of a century. 
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